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INTRODUCTION

Assume that an employee is injured on the job. In such a case,
the injured employee may be entitled to certain types of recovery
and benefits. For instance, the employee may be able to receive
compensation for pain and suffering, disfigurement or dismemberment, loss of earnings, medical expenses, and loss of consortium.'
1. See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978) (asserting that the injured

spouse has the "exclusive right to recover for the normal damages associated with" direct
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Moreover, the employee may also be able to receive a variety of
benefits based on the loss of earning capacity, including workers'
compensation, disability wage replacement, and personal injury
damages. If this employee is not, and has never been, married,
then title to these loss of earning capacity benefits is not an issuethe benefits will be considered separate property. 2 However, assume that this employee, after being injured, marries and subsequently divorces. In this latter situation, where the employee's
marital status changes, determining the nature of the title as to the
loss of earning capacity benefits is quite important.
For example, in the instance of a divorce, a court must know the
nature of the title to specific property in order to make an equitable division.' This knowledge is particularly important if the court
sits in a jurisdiction that does not permit an invasion of the
spouses' separate property upon divorce. Determining title to certain property may also affect creditor's rights, as some creditors
may have claims only against marital, and not separate, property,
or vice versa. In addition, the determination of title may be necessary upon the death of a spouse if the right of inheritance differs
with regard to marital and separate property.
Whether property is considered marital or separate property depends upon the jurisdiction and whether it follows the common-law
system or the community property system. In a community property jurisdiction, all property brought into or acquired during the
marriage is presumed to be community property; in other words,
property is held in equal undivided interests by both spouses.4
Conversely, in a common-law jurisdiction, all property brought
into or acquired during the marriage is not jointly owned unless the

physical injuries in addition to a loss of consortium action); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d
390, 396 (Tex. 1972) (holding that recovery for personal injuries covers physical pain and
suffering as well as disfigurement). In addition, the non-injured spouse may maintain a loss
of consortium action. See Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667 (viewing a loss of consortium action as an action independent of the injured spouse's cause of action).
2. Cf. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (stating that property owned before marriage is the
separate property of the owning spouse).
3. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.001-.002 (Vernon 1998) (requiring the court to consider the rights of the parties in effectuating the award of marital property).
4. See 38 ALOYSiUs A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND
HOMESTEADS § 2.1, at 64 (1993) (defining community property as "property, other than
separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage").
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spouses elect to hold the property jointly.5 Despite these radical
differences as to the determination of title, these systems are alike
as to loss of earning capacity benefits and determining the rights to
such upon divorce. In particular, although both systems assign title
differently, each regard property similarly when making a division
between husband and wife upon divorce.6
The determination of title as to loss of earning capacity benefits
upon divorce is complicated-not by the existence of two different
marital property systems-but by the fact that the relevant law is
extremely convoluted.7 In fact, courts throughout the United
States have not adopted a singular approach to determine title to
loss of earning capacity benefits upon divorce. Instead, jurisdictions have relied upon four different methods: the unitary approach, the case-by-case approach, the mechanistic approach, and
the analytic approach. 8 Which particular approach is employed
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 9
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas implicitly adopted the
mechanistic approach in Lewis v. Lewis1" to determine title to benefits for loss of earning capacity upon divorce. 1 In Lewis, the
5. In common-law states, the general rule of title to property is simply that a spouse
owns all property that a spouse acquires. No common ownership arises solely because of
the marriage. However, upon divorce in common-law jurisdictions, earned property is
treated as equitably divisible property, thereby equating such property to the same realm
as community property in a community property jurisdiction. Also, in order to allay the
need to repeat the language regarding both the community property title and the commonlaw right of division on divorce, this Article will refer to both as "marital property."
6. The purpose of linking common-law and community property jurisdictions is to
convert viably the authorities concerning the loss of capacity argument from common-law
states as authority in a community property state, such as Texas.
7. In these areas, the title or the right to division of the property depends upon when
the property is considered earned. A part of the recovery may be treated as community
property, or divisible property, whereas a part may be treated as separate property, or nondivisible property. This concept forms the basis of this Article, which is a discussion of the
property principles to be applied to determine the marital nature of the recovery.
8. See Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1119-23 (Okla. 1991) (analyzing the four
approaches courts use to determine title to loss of earning capacity benefits); see also Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property
Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 149-50 (1995) (explaining that jurisdictions have
adopted varying approaches to the classification of workers' compensation benefits).
9. See Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1119 (acknowledging the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions concerning which approach to use).

10. 944 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1997).
11. Cf Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Tex. 1997) (asserting that a settlement
paid during the marriage for a pre-marriage injury is not community property). The mech-
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court concluded in a per curium opinion that a lump-sum workers'
compensation settlement obtained during the marriage for a premarital injury is the separate property of the injured spouse. 12 Notably, the Lewis case creates a hiatus; now, the loss of earning capacity is determined differently in the workers' compensation
context than in the personal injury context. 13 In the personal injury
context, such awards for loss of earning capacity have long been
considered marital property, because they were viewed as a replacement to the lost wages to which the community would other14
wise be entitled.

This Article addresses the contradiction posed by the Texas
Supreme Court in Lewis. Part II of this Article begins by discussing the two marital property systems and their differences. Part III
then provides a brief bverview of the history and development of
the Texas community property system. Part IV presents the various approaches other jurisdictions have taken in order to determine the nature of the title as to loss of earning capacity benefits.
Part V analyzes the recent Lewis decision by the Texas Supreme
Court. Essentially, Part V argues that Texas should adopt the analytic approach in order to determine title to loss of earning capacity
benefits. In particular, this Article proposes that the supreme
court should have used the analytic approach in regard to loss of
earning capacity in Lewis because Texas courts have done so with
other similar benefits, including retirement benefits and fire casualty benefits. Moreover, this Article urges that, in the interest of
uniformity, benefits for the loss of earning capacity should be subject to the same legal principle when determining marital property
rights, regardless of the context in which those rights arise.
anistic approach is essentially the same as the inception of title approach, which measures
the marital title at the moment of injury or onset of disability if different from the time of
injury. Under this approach, a subsequent change in marital status will not vary the result.
12. See Lewis, 944 S.w.2d at 631. The result would be the same if the injury was
sustained after the marriage had ended. See id. at 631. If the injury-related disability occurred during the marriage, however, the resulting recovery, whether in a lump-sum or in
installments, would be marital property, regardless of any continuing marriage. See id.
13. See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ
dism'd) (using an analytic approach when inquiring into the purpose for the Veterans'
Administration payments as either separate or community property).
14. See 38 ALoYSiUs A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND
HOMESTEADS § 3.9, at 96 (1993) (explaining that the loss of earning capacity is characterized as community property).
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COMPARING THE COMMON-LAW SYSTEM WITH THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM

At common law, a husband and wife were considered one legal
entity because they were treated as one "person" in the law with
no moieties. In this regard, marriage historically deprived the wife
of her separate property, and the husband had the absolute right to
control the marital property. Title to property was evaluated in this
manner regardless of whether the consideration for property was
paid by one spouse or whether it was paid in part by both
spouses.15 In the United States, several jurisdictions adopted
this
16
common-law method of determining title to property.
Eventually, states that followed the common-law method were
criticized for failing to sympathize with the identity of married
women.' 7 Subsequently, however, with the help of Married
Women's Property Acts, women slowly made headway, gaining
personal rights and control of their property.18 As time passed,
such legislation permitted women to hold separate property.' 9 In

15. For a synopsis of the common law with regard to marital property, see generally
CORNELIUS J.

MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

49-52 (2d ed.

1988) (discussing the common-law concept of dower) and WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 146-201 (1915) (devoting a chapter to dower).
16. See Scott Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property
and Common-Law Marital Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View
of the MarriageRelationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71, 76-77
(1973) (pointing out that forty-two American jurisdictions adopted the early common-law
property system).
17. See id. at 78 (describing the disparity between the marital rights of the husband
and wife as profound).
18. See id. at 79 (noting that the Married Women's Property Acts "advanced wives'
marital property rights under the common-law system"); see also Susan Westerberg Prager,
The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California'sCommunity PropertySystem,
1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (1976) (stating that the Married Women's Property
Acts were aimed at removing the common-law disability in married women).
19. Cf. Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Miss. 1988) (acknowledging that Mississippi's "constitution and statutes ... [regarding common-law coverture] were enacted for
the purpose of striking down the inequalities existing between husband and wife... [and]
to emancipate her from the common-law slavery to her husband" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Krupa v. Green, 177 N.E.2d 616, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (explaining that
"[a]n examination of the statutes shows the trend toward emancipation of married women
from the common law rules of bondage"); Margaret Valentine Turano, UPC Section 2-201:
Equal Treatment of Spouses?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 983, 987 (1992) (stating that "the treatment
of married women under the common law was so unsatisfactory" that equity courts and,
later, statutes gave married women property rights).
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fact, today, common-law systems allow both wife and husband to
have control of their respective separate property.2 °
In common-law jurisdictions, property acquired by the spouses
during marriage is presumed to be marital property. 21 "Marital
property," a term used for dividing property upon divorce, has no
effect on the common-law title of the respective property of a husband and wife, including earnings.22 Generally, separate property
constitutes one, or a combination, of the following: (1) property
acquired before marriage; (2) property acquired during marriage
but excluded from marital property because of a valid agreement
between the parties; (3) property acquired by gift, devise, or bequest. 23 Title to separate property and marital property is held by

either husband or wife individually, or in some form of co-ownership, such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or tenancy by the
entirety.24

20. See Arbesman v. Winer, 468 A.2d 633, 635 (Md. 1983) (declaring that Maryland
and other states enacted Married Women's Property Acts "to permit married women, in
derogation of the common law, to acquire and hold property for their own use"(citation
omitted)); People v. Wallace, 434 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (iterating that the
Michigan "Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the [M]arried [Wjomen's
[P]roperty [A]cts gave married women the power to protect, control, and dispose of property ... free from their husband's interference" (citation omitted)); Margaret Valentine
Turano, UPC Section 2-201: Equal Treatment of Spouses?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 983, 994-95
(1992) (recounting the history of the Married Women's Property Acts and explaining that
"[t]he laws were not uniform from state to state, and they accomplished, slowly and over a
long period, several different goals," including creating a separate estate for wives).
21. See Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 221 (Tex. 1982) (recognizing that in
common-law states, each spouse holds an equitable interest to a fair division of jointly
owned marital property, even though title may rest in only one spouse's name).
22. See In re Marriage of Engle, 646 P.2d 20, 24 (Or. 1982) (asserting that all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to marriage and prior to decree of legal separation is
presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually or by
spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy
by entirety, or community property).
23. See Seidman v. Seidman, 641 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (defining
separate property as "property acquired before marriage or property acquired [during
marriage] by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse").
24. See Faulk v. Haskins, 714 P.2d 354, 355-56 (Ala. 1986) (noting that personal property jointly possessed by husband and wife is presumed to be held as tenancy by entirety,
and real property is held as tenants by entirety, unless husband and wife state otherwise);
Nelson v. Hotchkiss, 601 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (holding that "a conveyance
to a husband and wife as joint grantees ordinarily creates a tenancy by the entirety");
Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974) (refusing to abolish the
estate of tenancy by the entirety, instead stripping the tenancy of the archaic and artificial
rules imposed at common law). But see Clark v. Clark, 387 P.2d 907, 910 (Mont. 1963)
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Nine states, however, have chosen not to adopt the common-law
system; instead, these jurisdictions employ the community property
approach. 25 Significant differences exist between the common-law
system and the community property approach. In a community
property jurisdiction, all property acquired and brought into the
marriage is presumed to be community property. This presumption continues until either spouse, or someone claiming through or
under such a spouse, makes a prima facie showing that the property is separate property. In contrast, under the modern commonlaw system, property is held jointly by husband and wife only if
they elect to take title jointly or if property is given to the spouses
as a gift. Moreover, property is not jointly owned by both spouses
during the marriage; rather, property is only considered common
property upon the dissolution of marriage by divorce. Conversely,
in a community property jurisdiction, community property is
owned jointly by the spouses during the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage.
Although more complex, the community property system allows
spouses to be partners with regard to property acquired by the
spouses as a marital entity. This notion of a partnership permits
each spouse an equitable right in the community estate, regardless
of whether the spouse ever contributed property to the marriage.26
(rejecting the estate by entireties as a permissible mode of ownership of property in Montana); Davis v. Davis, 75 S.E.2d 46, 47 (S.C. 1953) (noting that the estate of tenancy by the
entirety has no longer any existence in South Carolina); Schimke v. Karlstad, 208 N.W.2d
710, 714 (S.D. 1973) (explaining that "estates by entireties have never been recognized" in
South Dakota).
25. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (West 1991);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 1994); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1996); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2338 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.3-2,
40.3-8 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.001

(West 1993). Recently, Alaska partially adopted a community property system. See Keeping Current Property: Legislation, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 31 (reporting that
Alaska now statutorily requires an individual to have a community property agreement to
make community property principles applicable).
26. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 95, at 236-37 (2d ed. 1971) (explaining that the community property relationship functions like a general partnership in that each spouse has both a right to share
equally in the gains and an obligation for the liabilities incurred by the community); W.S.
MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:29, at 41 (1982)
(detailing the assumption that both spouses contribute equally to the acquisition of the
marital estate, even though one spouse actually may have acquired the property while the
other maintained the home).
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For instance, although one spouse may choose to be a homemaker
who receives no remuneration, such a spouse would nonetheless
have rights in the community estate, which would, for example, include the earning of the other spouse. Thus, upon dissolution of
the marriage, the homemaker and other spouse would have equal
ownership in all community property acquired during their marriage, and each spouse, would be able to maintain title to his or her
respective separate property. On the other hand, in a common-law
jurisdiction, all property would be individually owned and would
remain as such, unless an equitable division of the marital property
is made upon the dissolution of marriage by divorce.
Although the common-law and community property approaches
differ, some similarities exist. One similarity between the two approaches is the distinction between marital and separate property.
This bifurcation is necessary in both community and common-law
property jurisdictions because most states do not allow the division
of a spouse's separate property. Thus, a court must determine if
the property is separate or marital. This determination is necessary
because separate property will not be awarded to the other spouse,
except for, perhaps, child support. Conversely, marital property is
entitled to division upon divorce. Moreover, in a common-law system, each spouse's interest in the marital property is a presumptive
one-half.27 Although not a titled interest, this interest is very similar to the interest that a divorcing spouse has in a community property system.
The similarities between the common-law and community property systems are important in order to draw proper analogies from
common-law jurisdiction case law. Merely because Texas classifies
marital property according to the community property approach
does not mean that precedent regarding marital property from
common-law jurisdictions is inapplicable. Rather, in order to develop a proper approach regarding division of marital property,
case law from common-law jurisdictions may be helpful. However,
before exploring the various methods used to classify marital property, understanding the community property approach in Texas is
necessary.
27. See RICHARD H. CHUSED, A MODERN APPROACH TO PROPERTY 306 (1978) (stating that each spouse is presumed to have a one-half interest in the marital property upon
termination of the marriage).
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THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM IN TEXAS

History and Development

Texas is one of the nine states that employs the community property approach to classifying marital property. 28 In fact, the community property system has been an integral part of Texas law since
Texas' Spanish beginnings. In 1836, after winning independence
from Mexico, the Republic of Texas retained the community property concept in its Constitution.29 This concept was also carried
over into the Texas Constitution and has been statutorily expanded
upon since. 30 Furthermore, Texas courts have thrived on community property principles because of the long-held belief that a husband and wife have an equal right to own and hold title to
property.3 '

28. In addition to Texas, the traditional community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington. See WILLIAM Q. DE
FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §1, at 1 (2d ed.
1971); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (West 1991);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 1994); Idaho Code § 32-906 (1996); LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 2338 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.3-2, 40.38 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1997). Wisconsin has adopted the

Uniform Marital Property Act, which is essentially a community property system, to become the ninth state. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-.97 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997)
(adopting the Uniform Marital Property Act).
29. See generally 38 ALoYSiUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY

AND HOMESTEADS §§ 1.1-.47 (1993). Community property has existed for many centuries.
The Spanish and French who settled in the new world brought the community property
system to the American Southwest. However, even after Texas won its independence from
Mexico and became part of the United States of America, it retained the community property system. This brief synopsis of community property is not meant to be exhaustive.
Numerous articles have explored the nature of marital property and there is no desire or
attempt here to duplicate. See generally WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); 38 ALoYsius A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS
PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND HOMESTEADS §§ 2.1-.7 (1993); Charles Sumer Lobinger, The Marital Community: Its Origin and Diffusion, 14 A.B.A. J. 211 (1928).
30. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (adopting the concept of community property);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (a) (Vernon 1998) (creating a rebuttable presumption that

property held by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is community
property).
31. See 38 ALoYSiUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE: MARITAL PROPERTY AND
HOMESTEADS §§ 1.20-.47 (1993) (discussing the development of Texas' community property system and how wives have, in a variety of ways, been treated equally in regard to
property acquired during the marriage).
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1. The Texas Constitution
Since 1845, the initial source for the distinction between separate
and community property in Texas has been the Texas Constitution.32 Article 16, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution defines separate and community property by affirmatively setting aside certain
property as the separate property of each spouse.3 3 In particular,
the Constitution defines separate property as "all property, both
real or personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage,
and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent. ' ' 34 The Constitution further distinguishes community property from separate
property by defining community property through implied exclusion.35 The Constitution's very wording implies that anything that
is not specifically delineated as separate property is community
32. See TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 19 (stating that "[a]ll property, both real and
personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise or, descent, shall be the separate property; and laws shall be passed
more clearly defining the rights of the wife" in relation to separate and community
property).
33. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (designating all property "owned or claimed
before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent" as separate
property).
34. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. Article 16, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution
states:
All property, both real or personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage,
and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the separate property
of that spouse; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the spouses,
in relation to separate and community property; provided that persons about to marry
and spouses, without the intention to defraud pre-existing creditors, may by written
instrument from time to time partition between themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be acquired, or exchange between themselves the community
interest of one spouse or future spouse in any property for the community interest of
the other spouse or future spouse in other community property then existing or to be
acquired, whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall be and
constitute a part of the separate property and estate of such spouse or future spouse;
spouses also may from time to time, by written instrument, agree between themselves
that the income or property from all or part of the separate property then owned or
which thereafter might be acquired by only one of them, shall be the separate property of that spouse; if one spouse makes a gift of property to the other that gift is
presumed to include all the income or property which might arise from that gift or
property; and spouses may agree in writing that all or part of their community property becomes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of a spouse.
Id.
35. The concept used to determine community property is called "implied exclusion"
and was championed in Arnold v. Leonard. See Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 539-40,
273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925) (discussing the rule of implied exclusion).
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property. Thus, as discussed below, this implied exclusion definition raises a presumption in favor of community property.
2.

Texas Statutory Authority and Interpretive Case Law

Section 3.001 of the Texas Family Code embraces the constitutional designations of separate property. However, this section
also adds to the definition of separate property "the recovery for
personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except
' 36
any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage. 9
Although one might debate the constitutionality of this statutory
addition to the scope of separate property as defined by the Texas
Constitution, the provision remains firmly established to this day.37
The Texas Family Code also reaffirms the Constitution's presumption in favor of community property. Section 3.003(a) of the
Family Code states that "[p]roperty possessed by either spouse
during or on the dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property. '38 Section 3.003(b) further states that the standard
of proof to overcome this presumption is clear and convincing evidence. 39 Hence, for a party to establish property as separate property, that party must trace and clearly identify the property claimed
to be separate property.40 However, a party cannot overcome the
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon 1998). Section 3.001 states:
A spouse's separate property consists of:
1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;
2) property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and
3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except
any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.
Id.
37. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex. 1972) (upholding the constitutionality of an older codification of Section 3.001(3)). In Graham, the statute in question
was Section 5.01 of the Texas Family Code which stated that "the recovery for personal
injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning
capacity during marriage" is separate property. Id. The court held this provision constitutional. See id.
38. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (Vernon 1998).
39. See id. § 3.003(b) (stating "[t]he degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence").
40. See id. (requiring the existence of separate property to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence); McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973) (explaining
a party must clearly identify and trace property claimed to be separate property); see also
Schmidt v. Huppman, 73 Tex. 112, 115, 11 S.W. 175, 176 (1889) (stating that although separate property has gone through mutations, if it is "indisputably traced and identified" as
separate property, then it maintains that character).
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community property presumption once property has become so
commingled as to lose its separate property identity or where, for
whatever reason, the requisite burden of proof cannot be
sustained.4
Despite the constitutional and statutory authority for the presumption in favor of community property, many courts have taken
an alternate, but not inconsistent, view.42 Cases have minimized
such a presumption by employing an affirmative test to identify
community property. 43 This test goes beyond the community property presumption and classifies property as community property if
it was acquired by the efforts of the husband and the wife.44 Accordingly, although the constitutional and statutory definitions of
community property would appear to be enough to enumerate
what is community property, a second means of classifying property, based on when the title right was acquired, has evolved as
well. Typically, there is little difference in terms of the practical
result. However, the tension between the community property
presumption and this latter "inception of title" theory is evident
with regard to loss of earning capacity benefits. Because the right
41. See McKinley, 496 S.W.2d at 543; see also Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783
(Tex. 1965) (reiterating the established rule that the commingling of separate and community property does not overcome the community property presumption); Hodge v. Ellis,
154 Tex. 341, 352, 277 S.W.2d 900, 907 (1955) (recognizing that when separate and community property are commingled, the community presumption prevails).
42. Several cases have applied the principles of "implied exclusion" and "onerous title." See, e.g., Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 498, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953) (holding
the production of gas to be separate property because of the lack of "an expenditure of
community funds or effort ... to impress community character on the gas"); Arnold v.
Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925) (describing the implied exclusion rule
as one which prohibits legislators from adding to or withdrawing from circumstances in
which a right is acquired); Epperson v. Jones, 65 Tex. 425, 429 (1886) (holding that profits
derived from an investment of the wife's separate property would be community property);
DeBlane v. Lynch, 23 Tex. 25, 28 (1859) (holding that crops grown on the wife's separate
property with all expenses borne by her separate property are community property); Smith
v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 324 (1856) (noting that, where the husband purchases land with his
separate property funds and puts title in the name of his wife, a gift to her is presumed).
43. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex. 1972) (discussing the requirement of property being acquired by community effort to qualify as community property);
Norris, 152 Tex. at 498, 260 S.W.2d at 680 (requiring the expenditure of community effort
or funds for property to be classified as community property).
44. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 395 (justifying the characterization of recovery for
personal injury as separate property on the basis that personal injury is not acquired by
community effort); Norris,152 Tex. at 498, 260 S.W.2d at 680 (converting separate property
into community property after the expenditure of community funds, talent, and labor).
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to such benefits may have been acquired before marriage, any ben-

efits received during marriage are treated as the disabled spouse's
separate property. To comprehend this tension fully, a further understanding of the inception of title theory is important.
B.

Defining and Distinguishing Separate Property and
Community Property: The Inception of Title Theory

To determine title to marital property in Texas, one must consider the time of acquisition of the property and the definitions of
community and separate property. With regard to determining the
time of the acquisition of the property, Texas courts generally utilize the inception of title theory. 45 As mentioned, under this the-

ory, the character of property is determined at the time the
property, or any right to the property, is acquired.46
Accordingly, any property acquired prior to marriage is characterized as separate property.47 Moreover, if an asset was owned or
possessed during the marriage, the asset is presumed to be commu45. The two basic theories utilized to determine the time when marital title is measured are "inception of title" and "apportionment." See McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d
381, 383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd) (evaluating the inception of title theory and the apportionment theory to determine the title of an insurance policy purchased
before marriage, but for which premiums had been paid from community property during
the marriage). In McCurdy, the court employed the inception of title theory, holding that
because the policy had been acquired before marriage, the title was entirely separate. See
id. at 384 (believing that the inception of title theory would best promote uniformity). In
this regard, title would not be apportioned in accordance with the premiums paid, but the
right of the community property would be reimbursement of the premiums paid. See id.
In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to follow the California rule of apportionment with regard to insurance proceeds and realty, which is followed by the State of Washington. See id. at 383.
46. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 271, 224 S.W.2d 471, 474 (1949) (holding that
the husband had a claim of title to land when he first acquired the land, well before his
legal title to the land was perfected by adverse possession). In Strong, Anderson Strong,
while single, bought a tract of land. See id. at 269, 224 S.W.2d at 473. The deed, however,
erroneously described an adjacent tract. See id. Strong went into possession of the land he
thought he had purchased, and before the ten-year statute of adverse possession was complete, he married, divorced, and married again. See id. The ten-year period was completed
during the second marriage. See id. The Texas Supreme Court held that the land was his
separate property because the inception of title occurred before his first marriage, based
upon his right to reform the deed. See id. at 271, 224 S.W.2d at 474-75. The right of
reformation was a sufficient interest or right in the land to support the inception of title.
See id.
47. Cf TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (stating that all property "owned or claimed before
marriage" is separate property).
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nity property.4" To overcome this presumption and establish that

the asset is separate property, a party must provide clear and convincing evidence49 that: (1) the property was acquired before marriage, o (2) the property acquired during marriage was acquired by
gift, descent, or devise,51 or (3) the property was acquired as the
result of a purchase or exchange made with separate property.52
The inception of title theory establishes a party's right in a particu54
lar piece of property 53 and cannot be altered by subsequent acts.
For example, when property is purchased on credit acquired prior
to marriage, payments made on the purchase indebtedness against
the property during marriage do not alter the separate nature of
the property; the separate nature of the property remains even if
such payments are made from community funds.

48. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon 1998) (stating that "[p]roperty pos-

sessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community
property").
49. See id. § 3.003(b) (stating that the degree of proof necessary to establish that property is separate is clear and convincing evidence); see also Tarver v. Tarver, 349 S.W.2d 780,
783 (1965) (asserting that the statute creates a rebuttable presumption that all property
possessed by a husband and wife at dissolution of marriage is community property and
imposes the burden upon one asserting otherwise to prove to the contrary).
50. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (enunciating that "property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before the marriage ... shall be the separate property
of that spouse"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(1) (Vernon 1998) (stating that all property
acquired by a spouse before marriage is separate property of that spouse).
51. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (classifying property acquired after marriage by
gift, devise, or descent as separate property); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1998) (including property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent in the
definition of separate property).
52. See McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187, 199 (1849) (explaining that property received from the sale or exchange of separate property is also separate property); Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As MaritalProperty Subject
to Distribution,30 A.L.R.Sth 139, 150 (1995) (explaining that "[p]ursuant to most equitable
distribution statutes, where premarital property is exchanged during the marriage for other
property, the acquired property takes on the character of premarital property"). This concept is termed a "mutation," meaning a change from one type of property to another with
a direct link from the first to the second.
53. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 271, 224 S.W.2d 471, 474 (1949) (using the
inception of title theory to give the husband a property right in land).
54. See Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 493, 109 S.W. 911, 913 (1908) (holding that
"title which completes [a property right] relates back to its origin and takes character from
it").
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Consequences of Classifying Property As Separate or
Community Property

Although the classification of marital property may be a time-

consuming process, whether particular property is classified as
community or separate property bears directly on the rights of the
parties as to that property during and upon termination of the marriage. Typically, all separate property of a spouse in a divorce judgment is awarded to that spouse free of all claims from the
community or the other spouse." Conversely, because the spouses

are each deemed to have equal rights in community property, community assets are presumptively divided equally between both
spouses,5 6 unless reasons exist to support an unequal division.57
Although the title interest owned by each spouse in community

property is a one-half undivided present possessory interest, community property is not necessarily divided equally between the
spouses upon termination of the community. The Texas Family

Code grants the trial court the power to divide the community estate in any manner the court deems just and right. 58 Therefore, at
55. See Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1982) (explaining that, in a
divorce proceeding, separate property is ordinarily not subject to divestiture by the courts);
Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1960) (holding that the court may not divest a
party of legal title to real estate in divorce cases).
56. See Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.w.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1987) (affirming an equal division
of the community property against the wife's assertion that she was entitled to a greater
share because of the husband's adultery and her lesser income). In Stafford, the supreme
court held that these were only two of many circumstances that the trial court could consider. See id. That the trial court would start with an equal division and adjust as the
equities of the circumstances require is logical.
57. See, e.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981) (indicating that "the trial
court may consider such factors as the spouses' capacities and abilities .... relative financial condition and obligations, disparity of ages, size of separate estates, and the nature of
the property"); Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980) (holding that the fault of
one spouse may be considered when making a property division).
58. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998) (empowering the court upon
divorce or annulment to "order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the
court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children
of the marriage"). This just and right division is also the basis for the equitable division of
marital property in common-law jurisdictions. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502
(West 1991) (mandating that, "[i]n an action for divorce or annulment, the court shall ...
equitably divide, distribute, or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital property between
the parties ... in such manner as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors... "); McArthur v. McArthur, 353 S.E.2d 486, 488 (Ga. 1987) (explaining that, "in
determining the manner in which marital property is to be equitably divided, the factfinder is authorized to exercise its discretion after considering all relevant factors... ").
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the time of divorce, the spouses are not guaranteed an equal share
of such assets simply because an asset is classified as community
property. 59
Notably, even though Texas courts may consider the separate
property of each spouse in the just and right division of the community property, courts may not divide the separate estates of the
spouses. 60 Particular constitutional concerns arise from the divestiture of a spouse's separate property.6 1 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the award of the separate
property of one spouse to the other upon dissolution of marriage is
a taking of property that cannot be justified by a public purpose.62
Therefore, although the nature and extent of the separate estates
may be considered,63 constitutional concerns limit the trial court's
ability to divide the spouses' separate property upon divorce.64
Thus, a proper classification of property as marital or separate is
quite important, particularly when an equitable division of the
marital property by the court would be impossible otherwise. To
this end, four methods have evolved that reflect different approaches to ascertaining title to property.

59. A discussion of the division of property brought from a non-community property
jurisdiction, sometimes called "quasi-community," is not necessary here, except to note
that this property is of the same nature as property termed "marital property" in commonlaw jurisdictions. Marital property is actually separate property, equitably divisible upon
divorce because it was earned. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.002 (Vernon 1998); Cameron, 641 S.W.2d at 220. The term "quasi-community" seems to be derived from California
jurisprudence. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 125(b) (Deering 1996) (defining "quasi-community"
property as property from a non-community jurisdiction that would have been community
property if acquired in California).
60. See Cameron, 641 S.W.2d at 213 (forbidding divestiture of a spouse's separate
property); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977) (disallowing the division of separate property).
61. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (citing the United
States Constitution as grounds for the protection of private property).
62. See id. at 414-15 (requiring a significant public purpose to constitutionally justify a
taking).
63. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981) (identifying the size of the
spouses' separate estates as a factor when dividing community property).
64. See Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 141 (holding that the trial court may set aside the
separate property, income, rents, or revenues of either spouse for the support of minor
children); James N. Castleberry Jr., ConstitutionalLimitations on the Division of Property
upon Divorce, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 37, 41 (1978) (discussing the constitutional limitations on
the legislature's ability to create separate property).
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Loss OF EARNING CAPACITY BENEFITS:
THE FOUR APPROACHES

Both community and non-community jurisdictions grant the trial
court discretionary authority to divide marital assets in a manner
that the court finds is just and right.65 In this respect, jurisdictions
have devised various methods to distribute such assets. In particular, jurisdictions have adopted any of four main approaches to determine the nature of the title to property upon dissolution of
marriage. These approaches include the unitary approach, the analytic approach, the mechanistic approach, and the case-by-case approach. These approaches are also useful for deciding how to
distribute disability benefits upon divorce with regard to the loss of
a spouse's earning capacity. 66 Although these approaches have
typically been used soley in workers' compensation cases, they are

65. The trial court generally has discretion to divide the marital property of the parties
as appears just and equitable. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47 (Michie 1997 &
Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1995); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 3502 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-44 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-35 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1989 & Supp. 1998);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-114

(Michie 1997). In Texas, the separate property of spouses is not subject to the just and
right division power of the trial court. See, e.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213
(1982) (explaining that such a division would ignore the distinction between community
and separate property); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140, 142 (1977) (reversing the trial court's division of the husband's separate property because the tial court had
no legislative or constitutional authority to transfer his separate property to his wife).
Several other jurisdictions protect the spouses' separate property in a similar manner.
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/503-d (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190
(Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 8-205 (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (West 1997); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.171 (West 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121 (West 1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3504 (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473
(Law. Co-op. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1996).

However, a minority of states allow the trial court to divest the spouse of separate property. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.511 (Michie 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-44
(Michie 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1998).

66. See Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1119-23 (Okla. 1991) (analyzing the four
approaches courts use to determine title to loss of earning capacity benefits); see also Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property
Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 149-50 (1995) (explaining that jurisdictions have
adopted varying approaches to the classification of workers' compensation benefits).
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equally applicable to other benefits that replace an individual's loss
of earning capacity.
A.

Unitary Approach

The unitary approach is the most simplistic of the four approaches. 67 Under the unitary approach, an award for a work related injury resulting in lost earning capacity is the separate
property of the injured spouse, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.68 The rationale behind this approach is that a person's
health is that person's separate property. 69 Hence, because a workers' compensation award compensates the injured spouse for an
injury to his health, workers' compensation benefits must also be
the separate property of the injured spouse. 70 Essentially, the unitary approach requires a court to do nothing more than identify the
injury, determine the corresponding recovery, and then grant the
appropriate sum to the injured spouse. Despite this simplicity, the
unitary approach has been applied only in a few jurisdictions.71
New Mexico is one jurisdiction that has employed the unitary
approach. In Richards v. Richards,72 the issue before the state
supreme court was whether compensation payable under the
state's workers' compensation statute for work related injuries sustained during the marriage was community property. 73 The problem arose when, after six years of marriage, the husband suffered
67. See Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1120 (describing the unitary approach as the most
simplistic).
68. See Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As
Marital PropertySubject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (describing the unitary approach as one where workers' compensation benefits are the injured spouse's separate property, "no matter what the nature of the benefits").
69. See Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1120 (explaining that the unitary approach designates the
compensation award as being "uniquely personal" to the injured spouse); Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (implying that a healthy body is separate property).
70. See Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As
Marital Property Subject to Distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (elaborating that
because workers' compensation substitutes for a healthy body, a separate property of the
injured spouse, the workers' compensation award is also the separate property of the injured spouse).
71. See Workers' CompensationAwards, 14 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J. 1, 1-2 (1997)
(listing Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions that
have followed the unitary approach).
72. 283 P.2d 881 (N.M. 1955).
73. See Richards v. Richards, 283 P.2d 881, 881 (N.M. 1955).
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an accidental injury that rendered him totally and permanently disabled.74 For this disability, the husband was awarded $30 per week
in benefits.75
In determining whether the trial court correctly characterized
the nature of the workers' compensation benefits, the New Mexico
Supreme Court looked to the purpose of the state's workers' compensation statute.76 The court noted that New Mexico's workers'
compensation statute does not base the amount of benefits on an
increase or decrease in the injured employee's earning power, but
rather on a change in the severity of the disability.77 The court
viewed this basis as a change from pre-statute law, which allowed
recovery based on an increase or decrease in earning power.78 The
court reasoned that this shift in rationale should be considered
when interpreting the statute. 79 Thus, the court concluded that the
nature of the workers' compensation award was more closely related to the bodily injury than the inability to earn income.8 °
Hence, the court held that the award was separate property. 81
In reaching its decision, the court also relied on Louisiana precedent, which had concluded that the language of the statute determines the nature of a workers' compensation recovery. 2 The
Richards court noted that it need look no further than the statute
itself to determine the nature of a workers' compensation recov-

74. See id.

75. See id.
76. See id. at 882.
77. See id.
78. See id. (accepting the proposition that an "increase or decrease in earning power is
no longer the yardstick").
79. See id. (interpreting this change in rationale as providing additional support for
holding the compensation to be the separate property of the injured spouse).
80. See id. (interpreting the 1945 amendment to New Mexico's workers' compensation
statute).
81. See id.
82. See id. (quoting Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 198 So. 670, 673 (La. Ct.
App. 1940)). The dissenting opinion criticizes the majority for misreading the legislative
intent of the workers' compensation statute and contends that a proper rendition would be
based on the fact that the compensation is based on the amount of weekly wages being

compensated for and not the injury. See id. at 883 (Sadler, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for failing to recognize that workers' compensation should take on the same characteristic as the property it replaces). Under this analysis, the purpose of the statute would
be to compensate for lost wages and therefore, would be community property.
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ery. 83 Although the Richards court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have reached conclusions differing from its own,84 the
court distinguished the contrary holdings by stating that the workers' compensation statutes of those jurisdictions require different
results.8 Thus, although Richards may appear incorrect under
community property law analysis, the result is demanded by an interpretation of the controlling statutory provisions.86 Moreover,
Richards illustrates that although the four approaches described in
this Article may result in varying outcomes, each approach begins
with an analysis of the controlling statutory requirements of the
jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the use of the unitary method in determining title to
workers' compensation benefits is quite limited. Under the unitary
method, workers' compensation benefits are treated as separate
property.87 Yet, in states whose statutes treat such benefits instead
as wage replacement or lost capacity benefits, these benefits are
marital property during the marriage; in these states, the unitary
method cannot apply. Rather, the unitary method applies only in
states whose statutory schemes treat workers' compensation benefits as compensation for pain and suffering, which are necessarily
characterized as separate property.
83. See id. at 882. The result under the Louisiana statute renders creditors of the noninjured spouse unable to seek attachment or seizure of the compensation, thereby rendering the property separate rather than community in nature. See id.
84. See id. (acknowledging that Arizona, California, and Texas have reached different
conclusions). In Texas, the workers' compensation system is based on calculating the employee's weekly average salary, and the employee is compensated for loss of earning capacity. See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 347 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. 1961)
(declaring that "[wie have long held that the purpose of the [Workers' Compensation] Act
is to compensate an injured employee, not for the loss of earnings or for the injury itself,
but for loss of earning capacity"). A statute in Texas defining separate property similar to
the New Mexico statute would probably not be constitutional.
85. See Richards, 283 P.2d. at 882. The dissent, however, claims that the cases cited by
the majority from Arizona, California, and Texas are "direct authority against [the majority] and are not to be disregarded by reason of any supposed statutory differences." Id. at
883 (Sadler, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 882 (distinguishing Arizona, California, and Texas cases on the ground
that those cases were controlled by their respective statutes, and these statutes are different
from the New Mexico statute).
87. Cf Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As
Marital Property Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 139 (1995) (defining the unitary
approach as one where workers' compensation benefits are the injured spouse's separate
property).
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Mechanistic Approach

The mechanistic approach is arguably the easier approach to employ when determining whether a workers' compensation settlement or other loss of earning capacity claim is community or

separate property. In determining the character of the property,
the mechanistic approach relies on the exact time the right to such
property accrues and is also referred to as the "inception of title"
view. 88 Three justifications support applying the mechanistic approach to determine the nature of title.

First, most jurisdictions applying the mechanistic approach cite
an interpretation of their marital dissolution statutes.8 9 In this re-

spect, the purpose for which the compensation might be granted is
irrelevant. 90 For example, in Orszula v. Orszula,91 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that a workers' compensation award
for injuries sustained during marriage was marital property. 92 In so
concluding, the court relied solely on its determination that the re-

covery was not an enumerated exception to that state's marital
property statute. 93 Hence, by default, the claim was property ac-

quired during marriage and subject to the equitable division by the

88. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Thomas, 411 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the time of the claim governs the classification of the award as marital property);
Weakley v. Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Ky. 1987) (stating that compensation for an
injury occurring before marriage is the injured spouse's separate property, regardless of
when the actual judgment or settlement is completed); Marsh v. Marsh, 437 S.E.2d 34, 36
(S.C. 1993) (relating that the time the award was made determines whether it is marital
property).
89. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dettore, 408 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citing
cases that interpret the Illinois Dissolution Act); Johnson v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 703, 704
(Ky. 1982) (relying upon state statutory provisions to determine whether a workers' compensation award received during a divorce action is marital property); Hagen v. Hagen, 508
N.W.2d 196, 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (citing state statutory workers' compensation provisions and interpreting case law); Orszula v. Orszula, 356 S.E.2d 114, 114 (S.C. 1987) (using
a state statutory provision defining marital property to find that workers' compensation
awards are not marital property).
90. See Marsh, 437 S.E.2d at 35 (explaining that under the mechanistic approach, "if
the award or settlement is acquired during the marriage, it is deemed marital property
regardless of the underlying purpose of the award or the loss it is meant to replace").
91. 356 S.E.2d 114 (S.C. 1987).
92. See Orszula, 356 S.E.2d at 114 (holding that personal property, including workers
compensation awards, is marital property).
93. See id. at 115 (explaining that workers' compensation awards do not fit any of the
enumerated exceptions to the marital property law).
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trial court. 94 Orszula, thus, illustrates how the nature of the workers' compensation award is not a consideration under the mechanistic approach. 95
The second justification for the mechanistic approach is the expectancy theory. Indeed, at least one jurisdiction has disregarded a
statutory analysis, instead utilizing an expectancy rationale to support its employment of the mechanistic approach.96 In Weakley v.
Weakley, 97 the Kentucky Supreme Court determined the distribution of a personal injury settlement in the following two instances:
(1) when the injury and settlement occurred during marriage, and
(2) when the injury occurred prior to marriage but the settlement
was reached during marriage.98
Although not directly dealing with a claim for workers' compensation, the Kentucky court alluded to the similarity between personal injury cases and workers' compensation cases; 99 in both
instances the court noted that a similar analysis should be applied. 10 Thus, in Weakley, the court concluded that in a situation
where both the injury and settlement occur during marriage, the
compensation serves to replace the parties' expected earnings.' 0 '
In other words, the assumption exists that but for the injury, the
spouse's earning capacity would have remained constant,0 2 and
the uninjured spouse, having married a spouse with earning capacity, had an expectation that such earning capacity or money replacing the capacity would continue.
The Weakley court further stated that where the duration of the
injury might extend beyond the period of the marriage, the settle94. See id. (finding that workers' compensation and personal injury awards fit within
none of the statutorily enumerated exceptions, thus failing to qualify as separate property).
It would thus appear that the "implied exclusion" concept is also usable to determine marital property in a common-law jurisdiction.
95. See id. at 114-15 (analogizing the workers' compensation award to wages, thus
finding no error in distribution of the workers' compensation award as a substitute).
96. See Weakley v. Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Ky. 1987) (dividing property on
the basis of the spouses' expectations in the future).
97. 731 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1987).
98. See Weakley, 731 S.W.2d at 244 (outlining two fact patterns concerning the timing
of the settlement).
99. See id. (citing two cases dealing with workers' compensation claims).
100. See id. (analogizing personal injury compensation for permanent impairment and
loss of wages for an injury that occurs during marriage to workers' compensation).
101. See id. at 244.
102. See id.
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ment that corresponds to post-marriage compensation is the separate property of the injured spouse. 11 3 However, in light of this
determination, the Weakley court then suggested that a different
result is reached when the injury occurs prior to the marriage. 10 4
When a mechanistic analysis is applied to the division of lump-sum
workers' compensation settlement, the time the injury occurred
and the time the right to a chose in action accrued are apparently
determinative in characterizing the property.1 0 5 Accordingly, the
Kentucky court opined that if the settlement is for an injury that
occurred before marriage, the entire settlement is the separate
property of the injured spouse, regardless of the nature of the recovery.10 6 The court reasoned that the marital community has no
right to the injured spouse's pre-marital recovery because the injured spouse is expected to generate income during the marriage
only to the extent permitted by the disability.1 0 7 The Weakley court
also explained that the prospective spouse takes the partner as he
or she finds the partner, with no expectation of more. 10 8 The rationale behind this explanation is that because the uninjured
spouse married with knowledge of the incapacity, nothing more
should be expected. 109

103. See id. (designating as non-marital property that amount of the compensation for
loss of earnings that can be prorated to compensate for loss of earnings after the end of the
marriage). Apparently, there is no expectancy that compensation received after divorce
from an injury during marriage would be marital property. To this extent, the expectancy
theory differs from the pure inception of title theory.
104. See id. at 244-45 (distinguishing between a premarital injury and a during marriage marital injury).
105. See Marsh v. Marsh, 437 S.E.2d 34, 35 (S.C. 1993) (describing the mechanistic
approach as one where the compensation is marital or community property if it is received
during marriage, irrespective of the compensation's purpose); Annotation, Divorce and
Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution,
30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (defining the mechanistic approach as one where the timing
of the award is critical).
106. See Weakley, 731 S.W.2d at 245 (disentitling anyone who marries an incapacitated person from any share of recovery for the incapacity).
107. See id. (supporting the reasoning using the expectancy theory).
108. See id. (stating that the prospective spouse takes the injured person in such condition at the date of the marriage).
109. See id. (reasoning that the spouse of the disabled employee could reasonably
expect that the disabled spouse's earning capacity would continue during marriage). One
could argue that the spouse married with the expectancy that the compensation continue,
particularly if the compensation is payable in installments, and that this compensation be in
the form of marital property.
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Although Weakley did not involve workers' compensation, the
court inferred that a similar result would occur in a workers' compensation case. 110 The Weakley court suggested that, in the formation of the marital community, each spouse is entitled to expect the
current condition of the other to continue through the duration of
the marriage."' Such an analysis suggests that where the injury
leading to a workers' compensation settlement occurs prior to marriage, the other spouse should not expect any compensation or income based on such an occurrence. Hence, the award should be
considered as only compensating the injured spouse for property
that the spouse had prior to marriage with the
marriage not affect112
ing the separate character of that property.
A third justification for the mechanistic approach is the inception of title theory. Under this theory, the moment of incapacity is
the 11
determinative point for ascertaining title to the disability benefits. 3 Subsequent events, such as a change in marital status and
time of receipt of benefits, are immaterial." 4
C. Analytic Approach
The analytic approach to the division of marital property, also
known as the apportionment method, has a large following among
the states." 5 This approach requires the court to determine the
nature of the award-that is, what the underlying loss is-and the
nature of the workers' compensation statute from the outset. 16
110. See id. at 244 (describing personal injury awards for loss of earning capacity as
"similar" to workers' compensation awards).
111. See id. (stating that both the injured party and his spouse have an expectation
that, but for the injury, the earning capacity would have continued).
112. See id. (describing title to disability benefits for an injury that occurred prior to
marriage as being separate property because title vested prior to marriage). However,
compensation for lost property is distinctly different from compensation for the inability to
earn income.
113. See Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Tex. 1997) (stating that the character of
compensation benefits paid during marriage is determined not by the time of the injury,
but when the loss of earning capacity occur'red).
114. Cf Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 492, 109 S.W. 911, 912 (1908) (reasoning
that title always relates back and takes character from its origin).
115. See Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1122 n.12 (Okla. 1991) (listing both community and non-community states that follow the analytic approach).
116. See Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 545 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (Fla. 1989) (describing the analytic approach as an approach that looks at the nature of the compensation award to ascertain whether the award is marital or separate property); Eric W. Maclure, Freeman v.
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Crocker v. Crocker,'17 a case decided by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, illustrates this approach.
In Crocker, the court enunciated four factors to help determine
118
the nature of a compensation award under the analytic theory.
According to the court, one relevant factor is the purpose of the
award; for example, the award may be for lost earnings, loss of
future earning capacity, or another purpose."l 9 The second factor
is the time period of any diminished earning potential or disability.120 The third factor to consider is the nature and date of the
underlying injury.1 21 Finally, the
terms of the compensation award
22
warrant consideration as well.'

Clearly, under the analytic approach, the court must evaluate the
nature of the award itself.' 23 Such a task involves breaking the
award into component parts and determining what part of the
award, if any, is the separate property of the injured spouse and
what part, if any, is marital property.1 24 Under the analytic approach, the court is justified in examining the timing of the award
as well as the circumstances under which the compensation is
125
awarded.
Freeman: Adopting the Analytic Approach to Equitable Distributionof Workers' Compensation Awards, 71 N.C. L. REV. 2065, 2077 (1993) (remarking that the focus of the analytic
approach is to determine what the compensation award is replacing); Annotation, Divorce
and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution, 30 A.L.R.Sth 139, 150 (1995) (defining the analytic approach as one where the underlying nature of the loss must be examined).
117. 824 P.2d 1117 (Okla. 1991).
118. See Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1122 (enunciating four issues that states have addressed
in considering whether compensation awards are separate or marital property).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1121 (requiring courts that follow the analytic approach to look at the
underlying nature of the compensation award); Annotation, Divorce and Separation:
Workers' Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th
139, 150 (1995) (describing the analytic approach as one which requires an examination of
the underlying nature of the loss).
124. See Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation Benefits As
Marital Property Subject to Distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (explaining the
mechanics of the analytic approach).
125. In both the mechanistic and the analytic approaches, the workers' compensation
award would ordinarily be for lost earning capacity. In Crocker, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found the time of the loss to be paramount when it stated that "[i]n Oklahoma, the
dispositive issue in evaluating workers' compensation benefits as separate or marital prop-
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Additionally, a court may look at several factors to determine
the reason behind an award of compensation. 126 Among the factors that a court may consider are the type and date of injury and
whether the employee is significantly hindered from performing
the job.127 In evaluating these factors, the court is asking merely
erty, is not whether the right to receive benefits vested during the marriage, but rather to
the extent to which the award compensates for loss of earning capacity during the marriage." Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1122.
126. See Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 545 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that the
court should look to the nature of the injury to determine whether compensation is separate property); De Rossett v. De Rossett, 671 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ill. 1996) (listing factors,
such as age, health, employability, pain and suffering, and disability, when considering
whether to divide a workers' compensation award among spouses).
127. See Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 548 n.4 (Alaska 1962) (including time and
manner of acquisition, as well as health and physical conditions of parties as factors to
consider when deciding whether injury compensation constitutes marital property). The
specific facts surrounding the workers' compensation settlement often provide the best
method for determining the award's purpose. See, e.g., Bandow v. Bandow, 794 P.2d 1346,
1350 (Alaska 1990) (arguing that circumstances dictate the purpose of the award and the
appropriateness of its allocation as separate property); Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165
(Alaska 1987) (noting that the extent to which an award compensates loss of earnings is
determination of the marital nature of the property); Dawson v. McNaney, 223 P.2d 907,
910 (Ariz. 1950) (stating that allowances for personal injury awards are based upon loss of
earning capacity); Hatcher v. Hatcher, 933 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (maintaining that the component parts of destitute benefits may be separate or community property depending on the intended purpose); In re Marriage of Cupp, 730 P.2d 870, 872 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that portions of lump-sum disability awards paid during marriage
that are for future lost wages are separate property); In re Marriage of Bugh, 608 P.2d 329,
331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (asserting that workers' compensation benefits received after
dissolution of marriage for an injury occurring during the marriage are separate property);
In re Marriage of Robinson, 126 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (deciding that
disability payments to the disabled spouse become separate property); Weisfeld, 545 So. 2d
at 1345 (delineating the proper allocation of an award into community versus separate
property depending on its purpose); Dees v. Dees, 377 S.E.2d 845, 846 (Ga. 1989) (basing
the award distribution on the nature of the damage remedied by the particular portion of
the award); Cook v. Cook, 637 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981) (stressing that property defines
its character from the nature of the right violated); West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 247 (La.
1975) (requiring that compensation after dissolution of the marriage may be separate property); Queen v. Queen, 521 A.2d 320, 327 (Md. 1987) (remanding the case to determine
facts governing the allocation of the award based on loss of future earning ability); In re
Marriage of Ward, 453 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (characterizing the right to
personal financial security as separate property); Wilk v. Wilk, 781 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989) (requiring additional fact finding in order to properly allocate a workers'
compensation award as community or separate property); Pauley v. Pauley, 771 S.W.2d
105, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (assessing specific facts to determine the purpose of benefit
payments); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 841 P.2d 496, 499 (Mont. 1992) (classifying a workers' compensation award as community property); Lentini v. Lentini, 565 A.2d 701, 702 (N.J. 1989)
(concluding that equitable distribution of that portion of an award intended to compensate
future loss earnings was required); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 430, 435 (N.C. 1986)
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whether the award is to replace lost bodily security or whether the
award is to replace lost earning capacity.
When the underlying purpose of the workers' compensation settlement is to compensate the employee for bodily injury, the trial
court may determine upon dissolution of the marriage that the
award is the separate property of the injured spouse.128 Such a determination would be based on the fact that the award was not
acquired onerously but rather was compensation for an injury to
the afflicted spouse.129 Because each spouse's body is likened to
separate property, compensation for injury to the body is likewise
separate. 130
Conversely, if the underlying purpose of the settlement is to
compensate for lost earning capacity, then a trial court may determine that a workers' compensation award is marital property. In
Texas, such could very well be the case because the Texas Supreme
Court has long held that the purpose of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act13 ' is to compensate the injured worker for the inability to work.132 In fact, as recently as six years ago, a Texas
appellate court relied on the premise that the purpose of workers'

(identifying loss of earnings during marriage and expenses paid as a segment of an award
properly designated as marital property); Hartzel v. Hartzel, 629 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (distinguishing the vesting of benefits for the purposes of compensation); Kirk
v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 979 (R.I. 1990) (looking to the purpose of workers' compensation
benefits in determining the appropriateness of equitable distribution).
128. See Hartzel,629 N.E.2d at 492 (opining that workers' compensation benefits that
compensate for "the loss of a body part" are not marital property); cf. Bugh, 608 P.2d at
331 (explaining that a personal security right is separate property that is brought into the
marriage; therefore, compensation for harm to that personal security is also separate property, even if the harm occurs during marriage); Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1122 n.l (classifying
damages for pain, suffering, and disability as the separate property of the injured spouse
under the analytic approach).
129. Cf. Bugh, 608 P.2d at 331 (characterizing compensation for harm to personal
security as separate property because the personal security right is not acquired during the
marriage).
130. See id. (asserting that an individual's personal security right is separate property);
Hartzell, 629 N.E.2d at 492 (excluding personal injury compensation from the realm of
marital property); Kirk, 976 A.2d at 979 (including as separate property compensation for
disfigurement and loss of limb).
131. Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen.
Laws 987 (codified in TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001-418.002 (Vernon 1996)).
132. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Clack, 134 Tex. 151, 154, 132 S.W.2d 399, 402
(1939) (listing the compensation of injured employees as one of the underlying purposes of
compensation statutes).
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compensation is to compensate the injured employee for the lack
1 33
of earning capacity, not for lost earnings, or for the injury itself.
The premise that the award is for the loss of earning capacity can
further be evidenced by the fact that the workers' compensation
award, as computed under a statute, is for replacement of lost
wages.1 34 For example, in Texas, workers' compensation is
awarded when the average weekly earnings of the employee after
the work-related injury are less than the average weekly earnings
prior to the injury. 135 Thus, if an award is for the replacement of
lost wages, a trial court may determine that the award is marital
property.
Another factor that must be determined is whether the workers'
compensation vested prior to the marriage or after the divorce. 36
In such a case, as with retirement benefits, wherein the entire portion of the benefit is earned prior to the marriage, the property is
generally the separate property of the employee spouse.1 37 How-

ever, if the benefits are not earned prior to marriage but over the
course of the marriage, courts generally apportion the benefits between marital and separate property, depending upon what portions were earned before and during the marriage. 38
133. See Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1993, no writ) (reiterating that the purpose of the Act is to compensate for the loss of
earning capacity and not just lost wages); see also Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 395, 347 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1961) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to
compensate injured employees for loss of earning capacity, not just lost wages).
134. See Holland, 162 Tex. at 395, 347 S.W.2d at 606 (referring to the average weekly
earning capacity as a factor in the calculation of loss of earning capacity).
135. See id. at 395, 347 S.W.2d at 606 (claiming that replacement of loss wages is a
goal of workers' compensation).
136. Cf Cook v. Cook, 637 P.2d 799, 802 (Idaho 1981) (downplaying the significance
of the vesting of the right to workers' compensation). The Cook court illustrates that
though vesting is a factor, it is not dispositive. See id. Rather, the crucial factor is whether
the benefits compensate for "loss of earning capacity during marriage." Id.
137. See In re Marriage of Bugh, 608 P.2d 329, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (referring to
general community property principles to support the statement that an individual's earnings after the termination of a marriage belong to that individual as separate property).
138. See id. at 332 (noting that when the "earnings received after dissolution are in the
form of retirement benefits ... and are deferred compensation for work performed during
the marriage, then there is a community property interest in the earnings"); Weakley v.
Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Ky. 1987); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426
S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding that workers' compensation constituted community property because a divorce decree dissolved the marriage after the plaintiff sustained injury).
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A similar analysis could be applied to workers' compensation
lump-sum settlements. For instance, when the entire settlement is
in lieu of earnings prior to or subsequent to the marriage, the settlement is not intended to provide compensation for the period
during the marriage. 39 In this regard, any benefits should be considered separate property. 140 However, if the compensation is
awarded for injuries that manifest themselves in the form of lost
earning capacity over a period of time, including time during marriage, the compensation should, at least partially, be marital
1 41
property.
D. Case-by-Case Approach
Rather than adopting a single method by which to determine the
nature of a workers' compensation lump-sum settlement, several
jurisdictions have opted to determine the nature of such assets on a
case-by-case approach. 142 In doing so, courts generally reason that
adopting one of the other methods would mislead the trial courts
rather than provide them with a method by which to ensure the
proper disposition of a party's marital assets. 143 However, this view
139. See Bugh, 608 P.2d at 332 (deciding that compensation awards received at the
termination of the marriage retained their separate property status); Weakley, 731 S.W.2d
at 245 (holding that compensation for injuries occurring prior to marriage is separate
property).
140. See Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987) (holding as separate property a workers' compensation award that compensates for the loss of earnings after dissolution of marriage, even when the injury occurred during marriage); Cook, 637 P.2d at 802
(stressing that benefits for lost earning power outside of marriage is the separate property
of the injured spouse); Hartzell v. Hartzell, 629 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(designating as separate property that portion of a workers' compensation award that does
not compensate for loss of earning capacity during marriage).
141. See Hartzell, 629 N.E.2d at 492 (subjecting that portion of benefits that compensate for loss of earnings during marriage to a division as marital property); Cook, 637 P.2d
at 802 (relying upon the presumption in community property jurisdictions that property
acquired during marriage is community property).
142. See In re Marriage of McNerney, 417 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa 1987) (adopting the
case-by-case approach); Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation
Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 150 (1995) (indicating that certain states are not clear as to which method is to be used to characterize workers' compensation benefits). But see Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1120 n.4 (stating
that, in McNerney, the court implicitly adopted the mechanistic approach).
143, See McNerney, 417 N.W.2d at 206, 208 (preferring the case-by-case-approach
over the analytic and mechanistic approaches, both of which the court viewed as misleading). However, the McNerney court in dividing the property of the spouses applied what
would be considered the mechanistic approach to the marital property division. See
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appears to be the least principled because it requires the trial court
to make an ad hoc decision in each case. In addition, this approach
ultimately provides the trial court with little guidance.
V.

THE DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SETTLEMENTS IN LEWIS V. LEWIS

As previous sections have highlighted, how title to disability payments is determined varies tremendously. A need for certainty in
this area of the law exists, particularly in light of a 1997 Texas
Supreme Court case, Lewis v. Lewis,1" which upset the unifying
principles in Texas community property jurisprudence. As explained in Part I, the community property is presumed to be property earned or accrued during marriage. Courts have also utilized
the inception of title theory to classify property based on when the
right to the property was acquired. However, in light of Lewis the
application of these principles to disability benefits becomes somewhat confused.
In Texas, the underlying problem in determining title to disability benefits upon dissolution of the marriage is the ambiguity of the
language in the Texas Family Code concerning title to lost earning
capacity.145 In fact, two particular questions arise: Does the phrase
''personal injuries . . . during marriage" refer to a bodily trauma
suffered during the marriage or to the results of a bodily trauma,
whenever suffered, that are manifest during marriage? Furthermore, does the phrase "loss of earning capacity during marriage"
refer to the moment of the injury or to the time when the loss from
the injury is experienced? If the phrases refer to bodily trauma at
the moment of injury, the statute is espousing the mechanistic
view. If, on the other hand, the terms of the statute refer to the
results of the bodily trauma or to the time when the loss is experienced, the statute espouses an analytic view.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas in Lewis v. Lewis had an
opportunity to resolve the problem posed by the language of the
Crocker, 824 P.2d at 1120 n.4 (accusing the McNerney decision of employing, for practical

purposes, the mechanistic approach).
144. 944 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1997).

145. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.001 (Vernon 1998) (stating that "[a] spouse's sepa-

rate property consists of: ... (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse
during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage").
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Family Code. Unfortunately, the court forewent this opportunity
to clarify how title to benefits for the loss of earning capacity
should be determined. Thus, the Lewis decision by the supreme
court only added to the uncertainty in the community property system and the laws upon which it is based.
In Lewis, the husband received $30,000 during the marriage as
settlement of a workers' compensation claim for an injury suffered
prior to the marriage. 146 Approximately one-half of this settlement
was used to buy land deeded to both Thomas Lewis and his wife,
Eva Lewis. 1 47 Subsequently, Eva filed for divorce. 148 At divorce,
the issue was whether the land purchased was separate or community property. 149 In a per curiam opinion,
the supreme court held
50
property.1
separate
was
land
the
that
In crafting its conclusion, the court first had to ascertain the nature of the title to the workers' compensation settlement.' 5' The
court characterized the workers' compensation settlement as separate property. 152 The court reasoned that because the land was
bought with separate property, the land was separate property as
153
well.
Although the reasoning that the property purchased with separate property is likewise separate property is fully justifiable, the
supreme court's initial characterization of the workers' compensation settlement as separate property is insupportable. In fact, the
Lewis decision can be criticized in three areas: (1) for its statutory
interpretation; (2) for its interpretation of case law; and (3) for its
approach to the division of property upon divorce.
146. See Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Tex. 1997).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. Thomas Lewis believed the land to be his separate property because the
land was purchased with his separate settlement funds. See id. Eva Lewis believed the
land to be community property because the settlement funds were acquired during the
marriage. See id.
150. See id. at 631.
151. The Lewis court had to ascertain first the nature of the settlement funds because
if the settlement funds are separate property, then the land purchased with the settlement
funds is separate property as well. See McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187, 195 (1849) (noting
that property received from the sale or exchange of separate property is also separate
property).
152. See Lewis, 944 S.W.2d at 630.
153. See id. at 631.
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Improper Statutory Interpretation

The statutory interpretation criticism of Lewis centers around
the definition of separate property in Section 3.001 of the Texas
Family Code. In holding that the workers' compensation award
was separate property, the court relied upon the predecessor to
Section 3.001 of the Texas Family Code. 154 In addition to specifically defining separate property, Section 3.001, like its predecessor,
excludes from the definition of separate property "any recovery for
loss of earning capacity during marriage. ' ' 155 In Lewis, the controversy was over the meaning of the term "during" as used in the
statute.56
The Lewis court concluded that the use of "during" meant a onetime event referring to the point in time when the loss of earning
capacity was first sustained.157 Accordingly, under the supreme
court's interpretation of the Family Code, Mrs. Lewis was not entitled to any of her husband's workers' compensation benefits because he suffered the injury that gave rise to the benefit before the
marriage. 5 8 Moreover, the court reasoned that because the injury
occurred before the marriage, Mr. Lewis' loss of earning capacity
began before the marriage. 5 9 Thus, the court concluded that
although the workers' compensation benefits were not received until Mr. Lewis was married, they were his separate property. 60 The
supreme court further noted that the only way for a workers' compensation settlement to be considered community property would
be if the spouse's loss of earning capacity occurred during the
marriage. 6 '

154. See id. at 630-31 (relying upon Section 5.01(a) (3), the predecessor to Section
3.001 of the Texas Family Code).
155. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon 1998).
156. The basic question for this Article is what does "during the marriage" mean in
the context of a "loss of earning capacity?" As a brief introduction, we might ask whether
it means at the moment of injury or at the moment of loss when considered as replacement
for a certain specific time of inability to labor.
157. See Lewis, 944 S.W.2d at 630 (concluding that the loss of earning capacity was
fully incurred before marriage).
158. See id. at 631.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. (declaring the rule that compensation for loss of earning capacity that
occurred outside of marriage is separate property). Furthermore, it can be reasonably inferred from the Lewis opinion that if the spouse suffers from a loss in earning capacity
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In deciding Lewis, the Texas Supreme Court might have been
misdirected. A better interpretation of the Family Code is that
"during" does not refer to the time of the injury, but to the time of
the lost earning capacity by virtue of the inability to work occurring
during the marriage. In other words, the workers' compensation
payment corresponding to any period during the marriage in which
the husband was unable to work would be community property.
Under this interpretation, Mrs. Lewis would be entitled to consideration of her husband's workers' compensation benefits in the
property division. Thus, because Mr. Lewis chose to get married,
his "loss of earning capacity" during the life of his marriage to Mrs.
Lewis would be community property. 162 Basically, because the
Family Code states that separate property is "the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any
recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage' 63 and because Mr. Lewis' loss of earning capacity continued throughout the
marriage, the benefits would be considered community property
for the period of time that they applied to his marriage.
B.

Improper Interpretation of Case Law

The second criticism of the supreme court's decision in Lewis is
its interpretation of case law. The Lewis court cited only two cases
to support the proposition that title to marital recovery for lost
earning capacity is determined by the time of the injury.' 6 4 However, careful examination of the cases the Lewis court cited reveals
that they are factually distinct from the circumstances in Lewis, and
65
therefore, do not support the court's conclusion. 1
during marriage, the compensation for that loss in earning capacity is always marital
property.
162. This argument essentially is the apportionment, or analytic approach, that was
discussed in supra Part IV.C. of this Article.
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon 1998) (emphasis added).
164. See Lewis, 944 S.W.2d at 631 (citing Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Few, 456 S.W.2d
156, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971),
and General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
165. Compare Lewis, 944 S.W.2d at 630 (stating that the husband had "suffered a
work-related injury resulting in immediate permanent disability... " seven months prior
to marrying his wife and had received a compensation settlement ten months after such
marriage), with Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Few, 456 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.'IVler), rev'd on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971) (relating that the plaintiff-wife
was married to her spouse both before and at the time of the accident forming the basis of
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The Lewis court cited Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Few16 6
and General Insurance Co. of America v. Casper.167 In Few, a

Texas court of appeals held that when the disability occurred during a marriage, the wife had a community property interest in any
settlement received. 168 Similarly, in Casper, a court of appeals reasoned that no community property would result from compensa-

the claim), and Casper, 426 S.W.2d at 607 (reciting the facts of the case, including that the
injured spouse was married at the time of the injury but was divorced at the point in time
when her incapacity began; however, she subsequently remarried her former husband during the time in which benefits were accruing to the injured spouse).
166. 456 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d
424 (Tex. 1971). In Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Few, a wife who was injured on the
job brought a workers' compensation claim. See Few, 456 S.W.2d at 157-58. The wife sued
the insurance company for total and permanent job-related disability and joined her husband in the suit pro forma. See id. The insurance company asserted that the suit was for
the recovery of community property and that the husband was an indispensable party. See
id. at 158 (stating that defendant's points of error raised the issue of whether it was proper
to enter a judgment for the community when the husband was not a real party). The
supreme court reversed the intermediate court, stating that "Mary Frances Few and her
husband, Milburn Few, had been married for many years prior to her accident on June 20,
1968, and they are still married. For this reason her workmen's compensation award was
their community property." Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex.
1971). The supreme court, however, held that the wife had the right to manage the cause
of action alone, and the husband was not an indispensable party. See id. at 427-28 (holding
that the injured party, Mary Frances Few, could sue for workers' compensation benefits
without joining her husband).
167. 426 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In General Insurance Co. of America v. Casper, the wife, Zelda Casper was married to the husband, Odis
Moore in 1962. See Casper,426 S.W.2d at 607. The wife sustained an accidental injury on
April 1, 1964 but did not begin to suffer disability until December 11, 1965. See id. Meanwhile, the two were divorced on June 29, 1964. See id. The court held that no community
interest in the benefits for incapacity resulted from the 1964 injury during the 1962 marriage because "[n]o cause of action arose by reason of appellee's [wife's] injury until some
incapacity to appellee resulted therefrom." Id. at 608.
Thereafter, on January 1, 1965, the parties remarried. See id. The testimony was that
they were married only a short time, but the date of the second divorce was not proven.
See id. The court found that for at least some time after the 1965 onset of disability, the
parties were married. See id. (finding "no competent evidence that the 1965 marriage of
Zelda Casper and Odis Moore has actually been dissolved by a divorce decree"). The
court held that "[i]t is clear that, under Texas law, workmen's [(sic)] compensation benefits
for incapacity by reason of a general injury that accrues during marriageconstitute community property." Id. at 608. The court held that because some part of the disability, which
had begun during the second marriage, some part of the benefits were community property. See id. at 610.
168. See Few, 456 S.W.2d at 160.
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tion benefits paid when the wife's injuries occurred during
marriage but her disability began after divorce.169
At first glance, these two cases appear to state merely that when
an injured spouse suffers a loss of earning capacity during the marriage, the other spouse has a community property interest in any
compensation received during the marriage. The Lewis court concluded from these two cases, however, that the moment of disability is the deciding factor in characterizing such benefits. 7 °
Apparently, the court analogized cases where the loss of earning
capacity begins after divorce to cases where the loss of earning capacity occurs before marriage. Although such an analogy simplifies the characterization of compensation benefits, 71it disregards the
notion of apportionment in community property. 1
C.

Texas Should Adopt the Analytic Approach to Classify Loss
of Earning Capacity Benefits
The third problem underlying the Lewis decision is the approach
the court used to determine each spouse's right to the workers'
compensation award upon divorce. The Lewis court utilized a
mechanistic approach, which determines marital title to property
based on the time the right accrues. 172 Although the mechanistic
approach is one of four acceptable approaches to determining title,' 7 3 a more equitable result would have resulted if the court had
utilized the analytic approach. In light of Lewis and the ensuing
confusion regarding loss of earning capacity benefits, Texas courts
stand poised at a juncture between the mechanistic and the analytic
approaches.
169. See Casper,426 S.W.2d at 608 (referring to the first marriage between the parties,
which had ended in divorce before the wife's disability began).
170. See Lewis, 944 S.w.2d at 631 (emphasizing the timing of the loss of earning capacity as the key to characterizing compensation received for that injury).
171. See generally supra notes 115-41 and accompanying text. Although neither the
Texas Constitution in Article XVI, Section 15 nor the Texas Family Code definition of
separate property in Section 3.001 speak of apportionment, their wording is not inimical to
the concept.
172. See Lewis, 944 S.W.2d at 631 (focusing on the timing of the loss of earning capacity and ignoring the purpose for the workers' compensation settlement).
173. See Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1119-23 (Okla. 1991) (examining the different approaches); see also Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Workers' Compensation
Benefits As Marital Property Subject to Distribution,30 A.L.R.5th 139, 149-50 (1995) (noting the existence of various approaches to determining the character of workers' compensation benefits).
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In Texas, courts have utilized both methods, depending on the
nature of the transaction. 174 In ordinary contract situations, such as
contracts to purchase land and life insurance contracts, courts have
used the mechanistic approach.1715 In these cases, marital status at
the making of the contract is the determining factor.1 76 The mechanistic approach has been followed in adverse possession cases as
well. 177 Conversely, courts have followed the analytic theory in retirement cases.' Under this theory, that portion of the retirement
that corresponds to a ratio of time worked towards retirement during the marriage is community property and the remainder is the
separate property of the retired spouse.17 9 Because compensation
for lost earning capacity is more closely analogous to these later
cases than to cases involving contract rights or adverse possession,
the analytic approach should be used in calculating benefits for the
loss of earning capacity.
However, in order to promote consistency in resolving title to
property, similar types of property should be treated in a like man174. Compare Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983) (applying the analytic
approach to retirement benefits), with McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd) (employing the mechanistic approach to the determination of title to life insurance contracts).
175. See McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d at 382, 384 (adopting the inception of title theory to
characterize life insurance proceeds from a policy issued before marriage); Bishop v. Williams, 223 S.W. 512, 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ ref'd) (reviewing a contract for
the purchase of land).
176. See McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d at 382 (stating that the main consideration is whether
title was acquired before marriage); Colden v. Alexander, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1943)
(explaining that the character of the title of the property as either separate or community
depends solely on the parties' marital status at the time title was acquired).
177. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 270, 224 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. 1949) (utilizing
the inception of title theory to give the husband a property right in land before the title was
perfected by adverse possession).
178. See Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 945 (considering the value of retirement benefits);
Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 661 (Tex. 1976) (reviewing a grant of military retirement benefits).
179. See Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 947 (requiring apportionment when the value of retirement benefits are at issue); Cearley, 544 S.W.2d at 666 (approving a method of apportionment for "contingent interests in military retirement benefits"). An argument might even
be made that, instead of the inception of title theory, the apportionment theory should be
applied as the only rule. To this end, for a more universal application of the apportionment
rule in derogation of the inception of title rule, see Forbes v. Forbes, 257 P.2d 721, 722 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1953), which extends a community property interest in proportion to the
percentage of payments made by community property funds, and In re Coffey's Estate, 81
P.2d 283, 286 (Wash. 1938), which divides the proceeds of a life insurance policy if the
premiums are paid with community funds.
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ner, even when placed in different contextual settings. Such similar
treatment is vital to a workable marital property system in any jurisdiction. Yet, Lewis diverges from Texas precedent by utilizing a
mechanistic approach only in lost capacity cases. In the past, Texas
cases involving workers' compensation awards have utilized the analytic approach. 180 Likewise, cases involving property analogous to
workers' compensation awards have also utilized the analytic approach.'81 Thus, this Article advocates the use of the analytic approach, also known as the apportionment approach, for classifying
loss of earning capacity benefits in order to unify the Texas marital
property system.
1. Previous Cases Have Used the Analytic Approach in
Characterizing Workers' Compensation Benefits
The issue of whether workers' compensation is community property has been addressed several times during the judicial history of
Texas. 182 In fact, as early as 1921, Texas courts have considered at
least some aspect of workers' compensation to be community property.'83 In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Boudreaux,184

the

supreme

court

determined

compensation benefits were community property.

that
85

workers'

In so doing,

180. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the husband did not have a community property interest in his wife's compensation benefits where the injury occurred during marriage, but the
disability began after divorce); see also infra notes 192-93.
181. See Humble v. Humble, 805 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ
denied) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the apportionment theory to a retirement plan); accord Bandow v. Bandow, 794 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska
1990) (applying the analytic approach to proceeds from an annuity that resulted from a tort
settlement); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 430, 450-51 (N.C. 1986) (adopting the analytic
approach in a case involving proceeds from a personal injury suit).
182. See, e.g., Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex. 1971) (holding the workers' compensation award to be community property); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Boudreaux, 231 S.W. 756, 758 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved)
(favoring the view of a workers' compensation award as community property); Casper,426
S.W.2d at 610 (holding any portion of a workers' compensation award that accrues during
marriage to be community property).
183. See Boudreaux, 231 S.W. at 758 (reasoning that because workers' compensation
has its source in the same contract as the contract for wages, the compensation "partake[s]
more nearly of the nature of community than of separate property").
184. 234 S.W. 756 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved).
185. See id. (stating that the compensation was measured and derived from community wages, and thus should be distributed by statute guiding descent and distribution).
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the court noted that the compensation was incidental to the employee's employment contract. 186 In other words, because workers'
compensation benefits were computed based on the wages of the
employee, the workers' compensation benefits could take187on the
same character as the wages the employee spouse earned.
Texas courts have also held that a claim for unpaid installments
of workers' compensation benefits does not survive the death of
the employee. 88 However, such a lack of survivorship does not
preclude an apportionment argument. 89 When the earned compensation is owed to one spouse, it becomes the community property of both spouses. 190 To that extent, an action for compensation
that was to accrue for a time during the marriage would necessarily
be the community property of the spouses.' 9' Thus, any amount of
recovery due to a spouse that did not accrue during the period 1of
92
the marriage would not be considered community property.
Therefore, the possibility exists that a portion of the compensation
could be community property and a portion might remain the separate property of the injured spouse, at least to the extent that the

186. See id. (explaining that compensation arises from the relationship between the
employer and the deceased employee).
187. See id. (concluding that the employee spouses' wages are community property).
188. See Antwine v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 698 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the only claim that survived death was for benefits
accrued and unpaid from the date of injury until the date of death).
189. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976) (approving the method
of apportionment). Antwine actually supports the apportionment theory as well because it
essentially equated workers' compensation installments to be paid after death to wages
that would not be earned until after death. See Antwine, 698 S.W.2d at 227.
190. See Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 412, 83 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935) (holding that a plaintiff is entitled to half of compensation earned by the employee
spouse).
191. See Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987) (holding as community
property a workers' compensation award that compensated for lost earnings during the
marriage); Hartzell v. Hartzell, 629 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (regarding the
portion of a workers' compensation benefit that compensates for lost earnings during the
marriage as marital property).
192. See Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ)
(stating that workers' compensation for a post-marital disability is separate property even
if the injury occurred during marriage); Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd) (prohibiting the division of the portion of a workers'
compensation award that has not accrued prior to the termination of the marriage).
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rights to 19such benefits accrue after the termination of the
marriage. 193

2.

To the Extent That Benefits Accrue During Marriage,
They Are Community Property

Texas courts have stated several times that, to the extent benefits
accrue during marriage, they are community property. 194 This result has been reached traditionally by determining that the spouses
were already married when the disability began.1 95 Presumably,
because the spouses had a community interest in the wages the injured spouse earned, any compensation awarded in replacement of
such wages would properly be characterized as community property.1 96 In contrast, however, when the workers' compensation
award is intended to compensate the injured spouse for a period
outside the marriage, such awards have consistently not been con193. See Piro,327 S.W.2d at 336 (acknowledging the possibility of dividing that part of
the compensation that has accrued before dissolution of the marriage because such property is community property). However, a court cannot divide compensation that accrues
after dissolution of the marriage. See id. at 336-37 (explaining that to reach into and divide
compensation that accrues after divorce amounts to a prohibited "judicial compulsory assignment of compensation benefits belonging to the single individual" and not the
community).
194. See Patt v. Patt, 689 S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1985, no writ) (dismissing the husband's argument for an entitlement to a greater portion
of the community estate upon divorce for funds of a workers' compensation settlement
expended on community assets because the husband failed to establish that any portion of
the workers' compensation settlement was his separate property); York v. York, 579
S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (affirming the trial court's
reliance on the community property presumption in holding that a workers' compensation
award received during marriage is community property). In York, the court reasoned that
where the spouse is seeking to claim an asset upon divorce as separate property and does
not bring forth satisfactory evidence, the party has failed to rebut the community property
presumption and the property is properly divided as community property. See id. at 26.
195. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e) (announcing "it is clear that ... workmens' compensation
benefits for incapacity by reason of a general injury that accrues during marriage constitute
community property").
196. In a substantially similar situation, a Texas court of appeals held that Veterans
Administration (VA) disability benefits are separate property, to the extent that they are
paid as compensation for the inability to engage in gainful employment after the divorce of
the spouses, even though the disability arose from a war-related injury during the marriage. See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ
dism'd) (characterizing the VA payments as separate property because the payments were
for "service-connected disabilities paid to [the husband] after the granting of the divorce").
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sidered community property. 197 Courts have held that granting the
unlawnon-injured spouse rights in such assets would result in the
198
ful divestment of the injured spouse's separate property.
Nonetheless, an issue arises with workers' compensation benefits
because they are intended to compensate the injured party for a
loss in earning capacity. 199 For instance, where the loss occurs during marriage, the benefits are considered community property. 0°
However, upon termination of the marriage, each spouse loses his
or her interest in the other spouse's earning capacity, thereby converting the earning capacity from one of community interest to one
of separate interest. Assuming this rationale is true, when the compensation is intended to compensate the injured spouse for the inability to earn income for a period beyond the divorce, the asset
should be considered the separate property of the injured
spouse.2o '
3.

Lewis Authority Employs the Analytic Approach

Ironically, the analytic theory was also used in one of the cases
relied upon by the Lewis court. General Insurance Company of
America v. Casper °2 involved a dispute over a claim for total permanent disability.2 °3 The claim was instituted in December 1965
for an injury that had occurred in April 1964. °4 After an unfavora197. See Rucker v. Rucker, 810 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (noting that "worker's compensation benefits, received after divorce,
are not community property"); Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1976, no writ) (stating that "compensation for disability for a period after divorce is
not community property, even though the injury may have occurred when the parties were
married").
198. See Hicks, 546 S.W.2d at 73-74 (reiterating that a former spouse has no right to
the other spouse's compensation benefits when the benefits compensate for post-divorce
disability).
199. See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 396, 347 S.W.2d 605,
606 (1961) (emphasizing that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act compensates for lost
earning capacity).
200. See Hicks, 546 S.W.2d at 73 (designating as community property that part of a
workers' compensation award that compensates for the loss of earning capacity during
marriage).
201. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (denying the claimant any community interest in incapacity
benefits when the incapacity began after the dissolution of the marriage).
202. 426 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d at 607.
204. See id.
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ble award by the Texas Industrial Accident Board, the injured
party filed suit.2 0 5 In determining whether any portion of the workers' compensation lump-sum settlement was community property,
the appellate court sought to determine whether any portion of the
benefits had accrued during the marriage.2 °6 Because the court
found that the parties were married in 1965, before the time when
the disability began, the court held that a portion of the compensation benefits was community property.2 °7
In the end, despite the decision in Casper, the Lewis court concluded that the dispositive issue in determining the proper characterization of the entire lump-sum workers' compensation
settlement is the time at which the loss of earning capacity commences.20 8 Thus, in Lewis, the time of injury was the sole determining event, and apportionment could not occur.20 9 However, the
Lewis court decided the case on a per curiam basis without a full
discussion of the legal principles and the totality of the case law
concerning the issue.
4.

The Analytic Approach Has Been Used to Characterize
Property Analogous to Workers' Compensation
Awards

The supreme court's adoption of the mechanistic approach in
Lewis is also inconsistent with the manner in which the court has
treated similar property in other circumstances. The treatment of
benefits similar to workers' compensation, such as tort recoveries,
disability, and wage replacement benefits, demonstrates that benefits for loss of earning capacity should be treated similarly, namely
by using the analytic approach.210 In addition, workers' compensa205. See id.
206. See id. at 608.
207. See id. at 610.
208. See Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 631, 631 (1997) (emphasizing that because the
time at which the loss of capacity occurs is determinative, when the loss does not take place
during the marriage, the benefits are separate property).
209. See id. (explaining that the primary factor in the determination of title was that
the injury and loss occurred outside the marriage).
210. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972) (holding that, in determining the division of proceeds received from a personal injury suit, damages for pain and
suffering are separate property, whereas damages for lost wages and medical expenses are
community property). But see Andrle v. Andrle, 751 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. App.-East-

LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY BENEFITS

1999]

tion benefits are analogous to retirement benefits, which are subject to the analytic approach as well.211
a.

Tort Recovery for Personal Injury

Tort recovery for personal injury is analogous to workers' compensation
because such cases involve the loss of earning capacity.212 Typically, tort recovery compensates an injured party for
injury to the body under such categories as disfigurement and dismemberment, physical pain and suffering, medical expenses, and
loss of earning capacity.2 13 Texas courts have examined each of
these components of tort recovery in establishing community or
separate property ownership. 14
(1)

Recovery for Personal Injury: Separate Property

Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court of Texas first
considered whether recovery for personal bodily injury215 is sepaland 1988, writ denied) (noting that whether disability benefits are community or separate
property is determined by the status of the property at the inception of the title).
211. In the author's view, tort recoveries and disability and wage replacement benefits
are more similar to workers' compensation benefits than retirement benefits, but retirement benefit law may be argued in analogy.
212. See, e.g., Ishie v. Kelley, 788 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Ark. 1990) (examining loss of earning capacity in the context of a personal injury suit); Weakley v. Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243,
244 (Ky. 1987) (discussing the loss of the power to earn money in a personal injury
settlement).
213. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 396 (indicating that damages for disfigurement and
physical pain and suffering are available for personal injury); DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND
COMPENSATION 780 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that damages to compensate a victim of personal
injury include medical expenses, lost earning capacity, and pain and suffering); VINCENT R.
JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, 167-171, 188 (1994) (discussing the various categories of damages for tortious actions, including loss of consortium,
future medical expenses, future mental and physical pain, permanent disfigurement and
disability, as well as loss of earning capacity).
214. See Graham,488 S.W.2d at 396 (holding that recovery for bodily injury, including
both disfigurement and physical pain and suffering, is separate property of the injured
party); Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 266 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (holding
that medical expenses recovered during marriage for personal injury are community property); Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (holding
that compensation for loss of earning capacity during the marriage is community property).
215. A portion of a personal injury award typically includes compensation for bodily
injury, disfigurement and dismemberment, as well as past and future physical pain and
suffering. When a judgment fails to specify what portion of the recovery is for disfigurement and pain and suffering, and what part is for loss of earning capacity, the task of
categorizing the judgment becomes rather challenging. For example, one could argue that
some pain must have accompanied the injury, hence if the spouse was employed there
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rate property.216 In 1883, the supreme court stated in dicta that a
chose in action for assault and battery was property, and if acquired during marriage, was separate property. 17 Although correct in light of the law at the time, the decision was not revisited for
several decades.
When the supreme court again considered whether a chose in
action for personal injury was separate or community property, the
court reverted to a test more akin to that applied by Spanish and
Mexican law, which forms the basis of the community property system in Texas.218 In Graham v. Franco,21 9 the supreme court
promulgated an affirmative test, requiring that community property be the result of "the work, labor and efforts of the spouses or
their agents as income from their property or as a gift to the community. ' 220 In other words, property acquired by the joint efforts
of the community was said to be property acquired by onerous title
and belonging to the community.221 This affirmative test also recould be injury to both separate and community estates. In some cases the solution to this
confusion is to apply the community presumption. Proof of separate title involves overcoming a presumption that the property is community. Many marital property jurisdictions rely on the same presumption. As a result, if the presumption cannot be overcome,
we never reach the application of either the mechanistic or the analytic approach. At least
one court of appeals has held that where the judgment is silent as to the proportion of the
recovery, the community presumption should apply and all of the recovery should be characterized as community property. See Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1992, no writ) (finding that because the appellee failed to prove what
amounts of the settlement were separate or community property, it must be presumed that
all the proceeds are community).
216. See Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 332-34 (1883) (discussing the status of damages
received by a wife in an action for assault and battery). In Ezell, by way of dicta, the court
stated that a cause of action for assault and battery would be community property. See id.
at 332. This same theme was reiterated in North Texas Traction Co. v. Hill where the court
held that Article 4615 of the Revised Statutes of Texas of 1925 was unconstitutional. See
North Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 779-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927, writ ref'd). This
statute, approved by the Texas Legislature in 1915, made the recovery for personal injury
of the wife her separate property. See id. at 779-80. Finally, coming a full turn, the
supreme court in Graham v. Franco held that the recovery for personal injury to a spouse
would at least in part be separate property. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 396.
217. See Ezell, 60 Tex. at 332 (stating that "[t]he right to sue for damages in a tort case
is a chose in action, and property within the legal sense of that term").
218. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 394 (stating that an injury to the wife gave rise to
rights in her separate estate, not to the community).
219. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
220. Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 392 (emphasis added).
221. See Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 501, 260 S.W.2d 676, 682 (1953) (holding that
any property or right by one of the spouses given during marriage by work, talent, or
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quired that the community property be earned by the spouses. Accordingly, under this view, a cause of action for personal injury was
not considered to be entirely community property, as defined by
the supreme court in Graham.2
Subsequently, Texas courts have used a combination of analogy
and the analytic method to further support the view that an award
for personal bodily injury is separate property.223 An analogous
situation exists when a spouse's separate property, such as a car, is
damaged, recovery for the damage to the car is the separate property of the spouse.2 24 Therefore, when the spouse's body is injured,
the recovery is particular to the injured spouse and should be the
separate property of the injured spouse. 2 5 In the instance of both
the car and the bodily injury, the rationale is that the compensation
26
makes the person or property whole again.
(2)

Recovery for Medical Expenses and Lost
Earning Capacity: Community Property

Unlike recovery for personal injury, any recovery for medical expenses has been considered community property. 2 7 The rationale
behind this notion is that the community bears the liability for paying the medical expenses and suffers a loss for any lack of earning
capacity. 2 8 Therefore, any recovery for such losses should com-

industry is community property); Epperson v. Jones, 65 Tex. 425, 428 (1886) (presuming
that all property acquired by the husband or wife during marriage is community property).
222. See Ezell, 60 Tex. at 331 (arguing that of the property acquired during marriage,
only that property acquired by the wife by gift, devise, or descent is her separate property).
223. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 396 (holding that recovery for personal injury, "including physical pain and suffering, past and future, is separate property").
224. See id. at 394 (analogizing body parts to chattels and real estate in determining
separate property).
225. See id. (rationalizing that the body a wife brings "into the marriage is peculiarly
her own").
226. See id. (reasoning that "the recovery is replacement, insofar as practicable, and
not the 'acquisition' of an asset by the community estate"); Soto v. Vanderenter, 245 P.2d
826, 832 (N.M. 1952) (opining personal injury compensation to be the injured spouse's
separate property because it compensates for the wrongful violation of the injured spouse's
personal security).
227. See Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 396 (explaining that the community is burdened with
paying for those expenses that would otherwise be covered by the lost earnings).
228. See id. (reasoning that because both spouses have been damaged, both spouses
have a right against the wrongdoer).
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pensate the community portion of the marital estate.229 The net
result is that, to the extent that the community has suffered lost
income and expended money for the treatment of the injured
spouse, it should be compensated for its contributions. 230 Because
of this rationale, the supreme court has chosen to treat this portion
of recovery as community property.23 '
Hence, to promote uniformity and consistency, the supreme
court should apply the analytic approach and reasoning illustrated
above to the loss of earning capacity because this loss represents a
deprivation of income. For example, if a person suffers a non-work
related injury before the marriage and the incapacity continues
into the marriage, the benefits would be apportioned to the extent
that the benefits ameliorate the loss of earning capacity during the
marriage.
However, a more difficult and distinct problem arises if the compensation is in a lump-sum rather than in installments. Nonetheless, a similar argument, that the non-injured spouse married the
incapacity, can be made. Equally applicable are situations where
injury occurs during marriage; only that portion of the workers'
compensation benefit that relates to the time of marriage is considered community property. If a lump-sum settlement for lost capacity is received during the marriage, it could be allocated between
separate property and community property by the use of actuarial
and longevity tables. This method of allocation is consistent with
the analytic method.

229. See id. (concluding that recovery for medical expenses and lost wages is community in character).
230. See id. (stating that both spouses can bring a claim against the wrongdoer).
231. See id. (justifying the designation of recovery for lost earnings and medical expenses as community property on the basis that the "marital partnership" incurs medical
expenses and suffers from lost earnings). The facts of Graham showed that the spouses
were married at all times pertinent to the case. See id. at 391. The court had no occasion
to discuss property interests if the marriage were to terminate. See id. at 390. The Graham
court believed that "[t]he earning capacity, as such, would presumably be translated into
earning during the marriage, which would be community property." Id. at 396 (quoting
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 82 (2d ed. 1971)).
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b.

Disability Insurance-Why Andre v. Andrle Should
Not Be Followed

Benefits that may arise under a disability insurance policy, the
Veteran's Administration, 32 or the civil service, 233 also involve a
loss of earning capacity. In fact, the theory underlying disability
benefits is that they are a replacement for lost wages due to the
incapacity. Importantly, though, disability benefit cases bear a
striking resemblance to cases involving workers' compensation, as
they all involve the payment for lost earning capacity.
One of the cases in Texas dealing with a contractual disability
benefits policy in a marital property title situation is Andre v. Andrle.234 In Andrle, the husband obtained an individual disability policy during the marriage and paid the premiums with community
property.2 35 At the time of divorce, the insurance carrier was paying monthly installments to the husband for an injury he suffered
during the marriage.236 The husband agreed that any benefits received during the marriage would be community property, but he
also argued that benefits received after the divorce should be his
separate property. 37 The court, however, applied the mechanistic
232. See Ex parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1979) (holding that Veterans'
Administration benefits cannot be assigned because they are solely for the benefit of the
disabled veteran).
233. See Bonar v. Bonar, 614 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (discussing civil service disability benefits where the injury was incurred after divorce). Although federal law may call for a specific title result contrary to either the mechanistic or analytic approach, those situations that fall within the purview of state law should
be treated alike, using the analytic approach. See Johnson, 591 S.W.2d at 456 (holding that
VA benefits were for the use of the disabled veteran and not subject to partition); Bonar,
614 S.W.2d at 473-74 (concluding that the wife had no claim to her veteran husband's
disability benefits after divorce, but would have a claim to the retirement benefits).
234. See Andrle v. Andrle, 751 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied). At least two other cases in Texas have held the same as Andrie. See Simmons v.
Simmons, 568 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd) (concluding that
disability benefits were community property because they arose by contract during marriage); Matthews v. Matthews, 414 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ)
(holding that disability insurance carried at the time of the divorce was a property right
belonging to the community estate). In these cases, the rationale for the courts' holdings
was that disability insurance payments were akin to disability retirement. Furthermore, in
Busby v. Busby, the supreme court had held that disability retirement would be treated as
ordinary retirement for the purpose of division on divorce. See Busby v. Busby, 457
S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. 1970).
235. See Andrle, 751 S.W.2d at 955.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 955-56.
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approach and held that the benefits paid and payable after the divorce would be community property. 238 The court refused to espouse the theory used in a fire insurance case, which held
that the
239
title of the proceeds should follow the title of the lOSS.
At first, the result in Andrle seems difficult to explain in terms of
natural justice or the expectations of the parties. The only conceivable purpose for Mr. Andrle's disability insurance policy would
have been to provide income in the event of an inability to earn
income. To the extent that this loss is compensated during the marriage, it would certainly be community property. Conversely, to
the extent that it compensates a loss after the marriage, it should
be separate property. In Andrle, the husband was no more able to
work after the divorce than immediately before.24 ° Thus, in effect,
the court gave the wife alimony benefits for the life of the husband,
238. See id. at 956 (declaring that "[t]he status of property so far as being separate or
community property is fixed by facts which existed at inception of the title").
239. See id. (stating that the reasoning of Rolater v. Rolater, 198 S.W. 391 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1917, no writ), was inapplicable). In Rolater, the court held that the proceeds from a fire insurance policy purchased with the wife's separate funds insuring the
husband's separate property house were a replacement for the burned house, taking the
same title. See Rolater v. Rolater, 198 S.W. 391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917, no
writ). Although the fire insurance benefits is not directly analogous to the concept of lost
earning capacity, the concept that the benefits stand in place of the loss is analogous. See
Rolater, 198 S.W. at 393 (placing fire insurance proceeds in place of the fire-destroyed
house). Such is illustrated in Rolater where the court was not persuaded by the fact that
the wife's separate property had paid the premiums for the insurance policy that insured
the husband's separate property house. See id. at 393 (refusing to convert the husband's
separate property into community property merely because the insurance on that property
was funded by the wife's separate property). According to the court, the purpose of the
policy was clearly to replace the house if it should be destroyed. See id. at 392 (asserting
the rebuilding of the house as one purpose for the insurance collected).
The decision in Rolater contrasts sharply with Andrle. The Andrle court made an attempt, albeit a cursory one, to distinguish itself from Rolater. The Andrle court asserted
that Rolater was decided to prevent the wife from converting husband's separate property
into joint property for wholly inadequate consideration and without his consent. See Andrle v. Andrle, 751 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, writ denied) (considering
the underlying purpose of the Rolater decision). The Andrle court argued conversely that
Mrs. Andrle did not convert the husband's separate estate into community. See id. (attempting to distinguish the Rolater case on the ground that, in this case, no conversion of
separate property into community property is involved and that, unlike the house in Rolater, the policy here was purchased with community funds). Nevertheless, the Andrle
court converted the husband's loss of earning capacity for the period of time after the
divorce into community property. See id. However, the benefits that Mr. Andrle received
for the loss of earning capacity after the divorce should have been his separate property.
240. Cf Andrle, 751 S.W.2d at 955 (failing to mention that Mr. Andrle recovered after
divorce).
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even where there was nothing in the case to indicate that the wife
herself did not have a continuing earning capacity.
If the facts were changed under the Andrle holding so that the
husband had bought the policy before the marriage and had been
injured during the marriage, compensation received during the
marriage would have been the husband's separate property despite
the fact that it was supposed to be replacing his lack of wages at
that time. Moreover, if subsequent to the divorce, the husband
were to make a "miraculous" recovery, such that the disability payments would stop and earned income resume, there is no doubt
that such earned income would be the separate property of the
husband. Thus, due to the "unfortunate" recovery of the husband,
the ex-wife would lose her community property.
The arguments used with respect to disability insurance here are
applicable to workers' compensation benefits and other benefits
for loss of earning capacity. Disability insurance, personal injury,
and workers' compensation are similar to the extent that the recovery in each is for the injured spouse's inability to continue earning
wages. As such, they should be treated similarly when determining
marital title upon dissolution of the marriage.
c.

Employment Retirement Benefits

At first glance, employee retirement benefits might appear misplaced in a discussion of the division of a workers' compensation
settlement upon divorce. However, the topic is useful to evaluate
situations wherein Texas courts have determined whether assets
are community or separate property when their accrual occurs over
a period of time. This Article contends that, like retirement benefits, a wage replacement plan should be allocable over a period of
time. Because courts have designed various methods to determine
what portion of the retirement fund is separate property and what
portion is community property, courts should have no problem in
applying similar methods to wage replacement benefits.
Why courts do not apply the methods used to determine the
marital title of retirement benefits to loss of earning capacity cases
as well is not clear. One reason might be that a factual difference
exists between these two rights. In loss of earning capacity cases,
the apportionment principle is used only to allocate benefits based
on whether the loss is incurred during the marriage or outside of
the marriage. In retirement benefits, the goal is to have the bene-
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fits apportioned based on whether they were earned during the
marriage or outside of the marriage. Yet, the common thread between the two rights is the analytic, or apportionment, concept.
(1) Property Subject to Division upon Divorce
One might assume that retirement benefits are gifts bestowed on
the employee by the employer in reward for the employee's loyalty
and service. However, Texas courts have rejected this gift theory.2 4 1 Instead, Texas courts view retirement benefits as a "mode
of employee compensation" earned by the employee.242 Accordingly, retirement benefits are viewed as compensation for the em243
ployee's labor, just like regular wages.
Because such benefits are viewed as compensation they cannot,
once the worker is married, be categorized only as separate property. To the contrary, the compensation is an onerous acquisition,
and therefore, correctly categorized as community property subject
to division upon divorce. 44 Such characterization is easily apportioned where the retirement benefits have become available during
the marriage. However, the apportionment is also correct when
the retirement benefits have not yet become payable.245 Texas
courts have held that a contingent property interest exists in the
non-vested retirement plan, which is considered community property subject to division upon divorce.2 46 This holding is based on
the notion that community property rights can exist in assets that
cannot currently be reduced to possession.247 As a result, Texas
241. See Berry v. Berry, 647 S.w.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983) (citing Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex.
392, 403-404, 247 S.W. 828, 843 (1923)).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 403, 247 S.W. 828, 833 (1923) (holding that retirement benefits are not donations to the worker spouse but rather compensation for service).
245. The following example illustrates that retirement benefits not yet payable during
marriage are nonetheless community property, subject to division in divorce to the extent
that a portion of such benefits correlates to a period the spouse was employed while married. Assume that a military employee spouse has been employed for nineteen years and
married for eighteen years at the time of divorce. Also, assume that the employee retirement benefits become available in the twentieth year of employment. If the parties were
to divorce at this moment, the employee would not yet have acquired a vested interest in
the retirement benefits.
246. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1976); Trahan v. Trahan, 894
S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
247. See Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. 1965).
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courts permit this community property interest to be awarded to
the non-employee spouse in a division upon divorce when the retirement benefits vest. z48
(2)

Employment Commenced Prior to Marriage

Assuming as true the supreme court's notion that all assets acquired by onerous title during marriage are community property,
applying the mechanistic approach to employee retirement benefits
would make absolutely no sense. In fact, not applying this approach is particularly desirable because some part of the benefits at
the time of divorce may be separate property, and some part of the
benefits may be community property.2 49 However, the real difficulty arises in determining how much of the retirement benefit will
be considered community property if the divorce occurs before retirement. Because employers use different types of benefit plans,
courts have adopted different methods by which to calculate the
community portion of benefits for these various plans.
Under a defined benefit plan, the employer typically agrees to
compute retirement benefits based on a formula. 50 Such a
248. See Cearley, 544 S.w.2d at 666 (seeking to avoid "an unnecessary multiplicity of
suits" in ruling that rights to military pension "prior to accrual and maturity, constitute a
contingent interest in property and a community asset" subject to division upon divorce).
249. See Dewey v. Dewey, 745 S.W.2d 514, 518-19 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988,
writ denied) (holding that the inception of title theory does not apply to retirement or
pension benefits). The Dewey court relied on the fact that such benefits are a form of
deferred compensation for services performed by the employee-spouse regardless of marriage. See id. at 519 (illustrating the deferred nature of the compensation by stating that
an employee can only withdraw from the plan upon reaching retirement age, becoming
totally disabled, or terminating services with the employer). The court also notes that,
under the plan in question, the employee spouse had no vested right in the benefits at the
time of divorce or prior. See id. at 518. Had the benefits vested prior to the divorce of the
parties, the benefits would have been separate property, as they would have been compensation for services performed prior to marriage. See id. at 519; see also In re Marriage of
Joiner, 766 S.W.2d 263, 263-64 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ) (holding that when
retirement benefits vest prior to marriage they are characterized as separate property).
250. See Humble v. Humble, 805 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ
denied) (relating that the retirement plan at issue was a defined benefit plan, meaning
"that under such plan[,] a specific monthly benefit is derived based upon a formula detailed within the plan"); Steven R. Brown, Comment, An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis of the
Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-JudgmentPartitionActions: Cures for the
Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 1131, 1140 (1985) (explaining that, under
a defined benefit plan, "the future benefit to be received is specified in advance according
to one of four basic benefit formulas or, more commonly, with some combination
thereof").
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formula may provide that the retirement benefits will be equal to a
percentage of the years employed multiplied by the average of the
five highest years' salary. Moreover, a defined benefit plan allows
the courts to apply a pro-rated formula to determine the separate
and community components of the benefits. The community portion is computed by dividing the months of service while married
by the total months of service. Therefore, when the husband has
been employed for twenty-four years and married for only twelve
of those years, the wife would argue that one half of the retirement
251
benefits are community property.

Under a defined contribution plan, however, the employer
agrees to contribute a defined amount to the retirement account. 252
For example, the employer might contribute five percent of salary
to the account. When the employee retires, the moneys in the account may be used to purchase an annuity for the retiree or could
be distributed in a lump sum. To determine the separate and community components of the retirement benefits, the court must determine the value of the account at the time of marriage, all
contributions and interest earned during marriage, and that which
is earned after marriage. Only that portion earned during marriage
plus the interest thereon is considered community property.2 5 3

251. See Taggart v. Taggart, 522 S.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Tex. 1977) (discussing a military
retirement benefit and how to calculate a division of such portion as community property).
For an explanation of the difference between a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan, see Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ), and
Stephen R. Brown, Comment, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Division of Pension
Benefits in Divorce and Post Judgment PartitionActions: Curesfor the Inequities in Berry
v. Berry, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 107, 112-17 (1985).
252. See Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 768 n.2 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ) (stating that a defined contribution plan participant has an individual account to which either
the employer alone or both the employer and the employee contribute monies to the account); Steven R. Brown, Comment, An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis of the Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-Judgment PartitionActions: Cures for the Inequities in
Berry v. Berry, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 1131, 1137-38 (1985) (stating that a defined contribution plan's benefit amount payable to a retired employee "is determined by the accumulated contributions allocated to that employee at retirement"). Under such a plan, "[t]hese
contributions may be made solely by the employer ... or more commonly by both employer and employee .
" I.Id. at 1138.
253. Therefore, where an employee has worked for eight years prior to the time of the
marriage and, in that time, has earned retirement benefits, that amount is the separate
property of the employee-spouse. From the date of the marriage, the contributions to the
account are community property until the marriage is terminated. Typically, this amount
can be calculated by subtracting the value of the account at the time of divorce from the
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Under either plan, the value in the retirement earned during the
marriage is apportioned as community property. This apportionment occurs because only the portion of the retirement plan that is
contributed during marriage represents an onerous acquisition by
the community. Because compensation for the loss of earning capacity represents a replacement of wages for the disabled worker
spouse, this type of apportionment should also be applied to workers' compensation, and other payments for the loss of earning capacity, as well. That is, to the extent a benefit compensates for
during-marriage loss of capacity, it should be community property;
to the extent it compensates such loss outside of marriage, it should
be characterized as the separate property of the disabled worker.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The facts presented in Lewis v. Lewis should have led the
Supreme Court of Texas to reach a different result. In Texas, workers' compensation is meant to compensate the injured employee
for the inability to earn the same income as prior to injury. Just as
marital title to compensation changes as the marital status of
spouses changes, marital title to workers' compensation recovery
should change as well. Such a result is logical because workers'
compensation replaces income that would have been earned, but
for the injury, regardless of whether before, during, or after the
existence of a marriage.
In contrast, the Lewis court held that the nature of workers'
compensation benefits is determined not necessarily at the time of
injury, but at the time of the loss of earning capacity that results
from such injury. As other Texas cases point out, the loss of earning capacity begins on a certain date and may continue for a time.
In cases similar to Lewis, courts have held that the community portion of a workers' compensation lump-sum benefit is measured by
determining what portion of the settlement accrues to the spouse
during marriage. This portion is community property and the remainder is separate property.254
value of the account at the time of the marriage. See Iglinsky v. Iglinsky, 735 S.W.2d 536,
537 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ) (recalculating the division of retirement benefits).
254. Furthermore, when the loss of earning capacity begins after the marriage has
terminated, there can be no doubt that the entire amount of compensation is separate
property. However, when the disability begins before marriage, at least a portion of the
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If the supreme court followed the analytic approach, it would
have looked first to the underlying purpose of the award, which is
to compensate the injured party for lost earning capacity. Because
a portion of that award was meant to compensate the injured party
in the future, such as in the case of a permanent disability, some of
the award may be "used" by the permanently disabled spouse after
a divorce. Thus, to provide for a just result, the apportionment
theory should have been used in Lewis.
It may be an exaggeration to state that the Lewis holding shakes
the very foundation on which the community property system
stands. Yet, the Lewis holding is one broken thread in the fabric
and can be repaired by applying the analytic approach in all loss of
earning capacity benefit cases. The analytic approach that this Article favors is not foreign to Texas. Thus, Texas is well-equipped to
join the many states that use an analytic approach in determining
whether a lump-sum payment for loss of earning capacity benefits
is marital or separate property.

settlement should be considered community property if the incapacity continues into the
marriage. Likewise, the portion of compensation benefits accruing during the marriage
should be community property. Thus, the portion of compensation benefits accruing after
the marriage ends is separate property. In addition, some portions of a workers' compensation lump-sum settlement may very well be community property when the compensation
is for lost earning capacity that would have been earned during marriage. See York v.
York, 579 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (concluding that the trial
court properly divided the husband's workers' compensation settlement amount as community property because the husband failed to establish that the settlement was not payment for loss of earning capacity during the marriage).

